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Since the rise of shareholder values companies have changed their activities to maximise 
the value created for their shareholders. Such practices have been highly criticised and even 
pointed out as one of the many reasons for the latest financial crisis. Therefore, Corporate 
Governance has become a current topic and discussion on which model serves the 
companies better has been ongoing during the last years. 
 
The goal of the present thesis is to provide additional evidence on the claims that Finnish 
Corporate Governance model has been moving to align with the Anglo-American model and 
diverging from the corporate governance models of the other Nordic countries and 
continental Europe despite their economic importance as trading partners. In order to do so 
this thesis presents a critical analysis of the Finnish corporate governance backed-up with 
a 10 years study of the companies listed in Helsinki OMX 25 in subjects of board structure, 
ownership structure and compliance with the Finnish Corporate Governance 
recommendations. 
 
The Findings suggest that the recommendations of the Finnish Corporate Governance code 
of 2015 are more aligned with the Anglo-American model. Furthermore, Finnish code seems 
to be divergent from the Nordic model and from the continental Europe model known as 
Two-tier model. The data collected also points in that alignment. The Finnish companies in 
study have been under an ongoing change that led to the dominance of the one-tier board 
of directors’ structure, dispersed ownership, increase on foreign ownership which resembles 
Economies where the Anglo-American model dominates the Corporate Governance. Finally, 
in regards of compliance with the corporate governance recommendations, Finnish 
companies have decreased the number of deviations from the code and increased the 
quality of their explanation. However, that might be in fact an indicator of bad corporate 
governance. 
Keywords Shareholders, share ownership, corporate governance, 
shareholder value 
   
 
 
Contents 
 
1 Introduction and statement of the topic 1 
2 Preliminary literature review 2 
2.1 Rise of Shareholder value and Financial Markets 2 
2.1.1 Shareholder value 2 
2.1.2 Problems of the principal-agent theory 4 
2.1.3 Rise of the financial markets 5 
2.1.4 Main Street (makers) vs Wall Street (takers) 6 
2.2 Corporate Governance 7 
2.2.1 Anglo-American Corporate Governance model – One tier model 8 
2.2.2 Continental Europe Corporate Governance model 9 
2.2.3 Corporate Governance in the Nordic countries. 10 
2.3 Contextualisation in Finland – The Financial System in Finland 11 
2.3.1 1970s and mid-1980s - Credit-based finance 11 
2.3.2 Mid-1980s to 2000 – deregulation period and shift on ownership 
structure 12 
2.3.3 2000s to present – modernisation and integration of the Finnish market
 14 
3 Research question and methodology 15 
3.1 Sample in study 16 
3.2 Topics in Study 18 
3.2.1 Corporate Governance structure in use 18 
3.2.2 Ownership structure: 18 
3.2.3 Compliance with the Finnish corporate governance code 19 
4 Results and analysis - Finnish Corporate Governance Code 20 
4.1 The regulatory framework 20 
4.2 General Meeting 21 
4.2.1 Ownership Structure 23 
4.3 Board of directors 32 
4.3.1 Results Board Structure in Finland 34 
4.3.2 Analysis 35 
4.4 Managing Director 37 
4.5 Remuneration 38 
   
 
4.6 Implications of the present model 40 
4.7 Compliance with the code – “comply or explain” principle 42 
4.7.1 Results 42 
4.7.2 Analysis 45 
5 Final Discussion 47 
6 References 50 
7 Appendixes 54 
7.1 Major shareholders, results by company 54 
7.2 Majority shareholders, results by company 55 
7.3 Board structure, results by company 56 
7.4 Number of deviations from the Finnish Corporate Governance code, results by 
company 57 
7.5 Quality of the explanations 58 
7.6 Concertation of Ownership – top 5 shareholders, results by company 61 
7.7 Concertation of Ownership – top 10 shareholders, results by company 62 
7.8 Foreign Ownership, results by company 63 
7.9 Finnish Households Ownership, results by company 64 
7.10 Finnish Institutions Ownership, results by company 65 
 
  
   
 
Tables  
 
Table 1 - Companies in study ...................................................................................... 17 
Table 2 – Companies listed in more than one stock exchange .................................... 17 
Table 3 - Companies with dual class shares ................................................................ 18 
Table 4 - criteria used by Faure-Grimaud et al. (2005) to quantify the quality of the 
explanations provided when departing from the corporate governance code. ............. 19 
Table 5 - Matters on which shareholders can exercise their power ............................. 22 
Table 6 - Minority shareholders rights ......................................................................... 22 
Table 7 - Major shareholders in the companies listed in Helsinki OMX 25 ................... 23 
Table 8 - Major shareholders by company. Dual share vs single share system ............ 24 
Table 9 - Helsinki OMX 25 companies with majority shareholder ................................ 25 
Table 10 - Ownership concentration on top5 and top 10 shareholders ....................... 26 
Table 11 - Top 5 shareholders voting rights. Dual class share vs single share system 27 
Table 12 - Top 10 shareholders voting rights. Dual class share vs single share system
 ................................................................................................................................... 28 
Table 13 - Foreign ownership. Helsinki OMX 25 companies ....................................... 29 
Table 14 - Share Unification in Helsinki Stock Exchange 2000-2015............................ 32 
Table 15 - Board of Directors duties ............................................................................ 33 
Table 16 – Independence of the Company .................................................................. 34 
Table 17 - Independence of Major Shareholders ......................................................... 34 
Table 18 - Board structure in the Helsinki OMX 25 companies .................................... 35 
Table 19 - Explanation elements required for each departure from the Corporate 
Governance code ........................................................................................................ 42 
Table 20 - Number of deviations from the Finnish Corporate Governance Code and quality 
of the explanations ..................................................................................................... 43 
 
  
   
 
 
Figures 
Figure 1-Ownership by commercial banks among Finnish listed firms 1987-2011 
(Jakobsson & Korkeamäki, 2014) ................................................................................ 13 
Figure 2 - Foreign Ownership Finland 1995-2015 ........................................................ 14 
Figure 3 - FDI net Finland 1970-2016 – source World Bank ........................................ 15 
Figure 4 - Voting rights on the top 5 and top 10 shareholders .................................... 26 
Figure 5 - Share ownership by category. Companies Helsinki OMX 25 ........................ 29 
Figure 6 - Percentage of listed firms with multiple share classes. ................................ 31 
Figure 7 - Average number of deviations in the companies listed on Helsinki OMX 25 44 
Figure 8 - Average quality of the explanations. Companies Helsinki OMX 25 ............... 44 
Figure 9 - Quality of the explanations ......................................................................... 45 
Figure 10 - Finland's Inward FDI ................................................................................. 48 
Figure 11 - Finland's Outward FDI .............................................................................. 48 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
1 Introduction and statement of the topic 
The way company’s success is measured has been changing throughout time. One 
might think that company success is measured by the volume of sales, by the profit made 
during a specific period, or by the return given to its shareholders. Indeed, a company 
success can, and probably should be measured in many different ways. However, during 
the latest years with the increase in size, importance and influence of the financial 
sectors of the economies around the globe the way to measure success has shifted 
towards the shareholder value created in prejudice of any other company performance 
indicators. In other words, the way organisations reward their shareholders (i.e. increase 
their wealth) has become the primary goal of many businesses. 
With such increase in importance comprehending shareholder value and its implications 
for today’s business has become more and more important. Companies use Corporate 
Governance codes to define how companies are run and manage. The codes are 
approved by the board of directors and set how the power is divided and balanced 
between board of directors, shareholders and executive managers and how each of 
these are rewarded. The way corporate governance elaborated and defined can highly 
affect the direction of the company and play a major role in the success, or failure of the 
organisations. 
Therefore, Shareholder value and Corporate Governance have become a key part of 
contemporary business. To understand Shareholder value and effectively implement 
Corporate Governance can have a great impact the company long term success. Thus, 
I    plan to use the knowledge and work developed in the course Global Political Economy 
and Political Economy of Finance (where a simple analysis of Finnish Corporate 
Governance code has developed) to better study the topic and understand how it affects 
Finland, its economy and its companies. 
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2 Preliminary literature review 
2.1 Rise of Shareholder value and Financial Markets 
2.1.1 Shareholder value 
The idea of maximising shareholder value emerged from the discussion over the true 
purpose of a “Public Traded Company” that followed the Berle and Means publication 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property in 1932. The discussion about 
Corporations’ purpose went on during many years. For the ones that understood the 
public corporation as an evolution of private corporations, the idea that corporations 
should maximise the wealth of the owner made sense. They thought of public 
corporations as similar to private corporations where the controlling shareholder, or 
shareholders had almost absolute power. Therefore, whatever the shareholder, or 
shareholders wanted (which was assumed to become rich) was set as the company’s 
purpose. However, for the ones that understood that public corporations were 
fundamentally different from private corporations, that purpose seemed quite different. 
They saw corporations with a much wider purpose than solely increasing shareholder 
wealth. For them the corporation should serve the interest of all stakeholders, being 
these the corporation employees, customers, banks and even the society (Stout, 2012). 
This last view of the corporate purpose prevailed in the beginning backed by strong 
labour unions, active government regulations and centralised finance in the banks 
(Mizruchi & Kimeldorf, 2005). 
The strong labour unions represented a powerful force that countered the threat of 
corporate hegemony, making sure the corporations were treating their employees fairly 
and accountably for their decisions. The active government enforced through the 
legislation and monitoring that matters such sustainability, environment or employee 
well-being were respected. The banks as a centralised source of finance controlled the 
corporations’ actions by making sure they were not taking unnecessary risks. In other 
words companies would only have access to finance if they acted in accordance to the 
risk averse orientation of the banks (Mizruchi & Kimeldorf, 2005). 
Nevertheless, it was not up until 70s that the idea of “Shareholder primacy” started to 
become gain true strength. In 1970, Milton Friedman’s article The Social Responsibility 
of Business is to Increase its Profits described the purpose of a company as to make 
profit and distribute them to its shareholders. Although at the beginning Jensen and 
Meckling were arguing against the concept of shareholder value after a debate with E. 
Merrick Dodd they changed their positions and in 1976 in their famous article, The 
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Theory of Firm, they further enforced the idea maximising shareholder value by 
presenting the seductive idea of Principal-Agent model of corporation where ownership 
and control are clearly separated (Stout, 2012).  
The principal-agent model of corporation refers to the problem that emerges when a 
corporation owner (the principal) hires an employee (the agent) to run the corporation. 
Such model describes the principal with power to control and direct the behaviour of the 
contracted agent. And describes the agent with the responsibility to realise the 
requirements of the principal. When the principal fails to perfectly control the agent, it will 
incur a cost as its desires will not be completely accomplished. These are called agency 
costs (Stout, 2012) (Aglietta & Rebérioux, 2005).  
In a public corporation this would mean that the goal of the corporation is to maximise 
the value created for the shareholders. Since the managers are the ones running the 
company their goal would be the same as well. This would mean that while the managers 
do all the work, the shareholders would collect all the benefits. Such an unfair situation 
creates a conflict between principal and agent. Therefore, it is acknowledged that agents 
will do everything in their power to divert some of the value away from the principals 
towards them. Consequently, shareholders must create incentives, in other words give 
away part of the value to the agents (agency costs), to reduce the conflict to a minimum 
possible level. That is to say, everything that might reduce the conflict and align the 
interest of both parties is in fact improving the efficiency of the firm in achieving its goal 
(Aglietta & Rebérioux, 2005). 
Then the early 1980s fuelled the complete change to shareholder value as primary 
corporate purpose in the United States. The restrictions demanded by labour unions and 
Government regulations placed on corporations started to be understood as negative 
factors that impaired the corporation’s flexibility and increased their costs, thus impeding 
economic growth, and making it very difficult for American corporations to compete with 
foreign counterparts. To answer the crisis the United States went through a structural 
change that led to the liberalisation of the financial markets and deregulation. The result 
was less powerful unions incapable of protecting workers’ rights, and a less active and 
prominent state less capable of controlling and monitoring corporate behaviour. 
Furthermore, the liberalisation of capital markets made possible to the corporations to 
obtain capital by other means, rather than borrowing it from banks that previously were 
capable of setting limits for the corporations that depended on them. With a lot less 
constraints on their behaviour, the control of the corporations was left to the market 
(Mizruchi & Kimeldorf, 2005). 
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2.1.2 Problems of the principal-agent theory 
Principal-agent theory was based on three fundamental assumptions. First, 
Shareholders own the corporation, second, Shareholders are residual claimants of the 
corporation and third, shareholders are the principals and that the managers they hire 
are their agents. Although there is nothing wrong with the model, since there is nothing 
against a principal hiring an agent, Jensen and Meckling model cannot be applied to 
public corporations due the fact all the three assumptions do not apply in the public 
corporation as it is today in United States (Stout, 2012).  
Regarding the first assumption, it has been argued multiple times in economic journals 
that Shareholders won shares, not firms. From the legal point of view a Corporation is 
An artificial person or legal entity created by or under the authority of the laws of a state 
or nation(..) (The Law Dictonary, 2018) thus making it a “juridical person” that can be 
compared (in law) to a human being and just as them the corporation owns itself (Stout, 
2012). Therefore, instead of owning the Corporation shareholders own in fact shares of 
the corporation which, in reality are no more than contracts that entitle the shareholders 
to certain rights (Kay, 2015). In fact, owning shares gives them voting powers to elect 
the person that actually manages the corporation. Nevertheless, such power is 
theoretical as in practice, for most of the cases, shares are so widely dispersed among 
thousands of shareholders that their voting powers become irrelevant (Halburd, 2014; 
Kay, 2015). 
The second assumption was that Shareholders are residual claimants of the corporation. 
Such claim means that once the company has met all of its obligations they are entitled 
to receive the residual profits. In public corporations this means that the only profits that 
shareholders can receive are in the form of dividends. However, the payment of 
dividends is a subject approved and declared by the board of directors, that can only be 
paid when the corporation is financially well. Thus, it is possible that a corporation has 
residual profits, but the shareholders cannot claim them, for example because the board 
decided not to pay them. Therefore, shareholders cannot claim any residual profits even 
when they exist (Stout, 2012).  
The last assumption is that Shareholders are principals and Directors/managers are the 
agents. In the principal-agent theory the principal hires or dismiss the agent and has the 
power to control the agent actions. In the Public Corporations the shareholders indeed 
have the power to vote to appoint or dismiss the directors. However, they do not have 
the power to make the directors do their will. Subject such as sustainability, employee 
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well-being or dividends are exclusively decided by the board or managers. Concluding 
although the shareholders have the right to appoint or dismiss the principal (and as 
stated before in cases where the shares are highly dispersed through numerous 
shareholder this voting power becomes irrelevant) they fail to control the behaviour of 
the agents (directors and managers). With such limited powers shareholders are left with 
the power to sue the directors (when these to not act according shareholders’ interests) 
which is extremely difficult, and the power to sell the corporation share (Stout, 2012). 
2.1.3 Rise of the financial markets 
Davis (2009) describes as a “Copernican revolution” the change that occurred in the 
1980s as result of the liberalisation of the capital markets and freedom of capital 
movement across borders. Davis (2009) argues that, due their increase in size and 
importance, the financial markets and their signals took the place previously occupied 
by large corporations as main engine of the economies.  
As stated before, the liberalisation of financial markets allowed the corporations to obtain 
finance from other sources than the traditional borrowing from banks. If before the capital 
was relatively concentrated within each country economy and relatively isolated from 
external sources, the deregulation and liberalisation of financial activities allowed the 
flow of capital across countries. Thus, making possible for corporations to acquire capital 
through “innovative (and riskier) ways” such as commercial paper or securities (Kester, 
et al., 1995). In fact, such shift was quite fast that by 1994 the amount of debt in 
commercial paper was equal to the debt to commercial banks (Mizruchi & Kimeldorf, 
2005). 
Such facilitation of flow of capital, backed by the liberalisation of financial markets, 
deregulation and advances in technology led to a sophistication of the products available 
in the financial markets across the world. Exchanges between markets were eased by 
the advances in technology. These allowed greater speed in the flow of information, 
electronic and automated trading allowing market participants with greater opportunities 
to diversify, hedge, and increase profits on their investments (Kester, et al., 1995). As a 
result, due to the fact of being easily reach by anyone, their greater opportunities for 
profit and liquidity financial derivatives such as forwards, futures, options, securities, 
swaps, and sophisticated combinations of them on interest rates, exchange rates, 
stocks, and bonds become popular among investors. Consequently, the volume of these 
traded world-wide increased greatly over the last years, thus increasing the importance 
of financial markets. 
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However, the down-side of such changes is the increased volatility of the markets. 
Investors are overwhelmed with constant information (that might be true or not) flowing 
fast from all across the world and since they can trade easily and fast (in most of the 
cases only requiring a simple computer click) they can cause abrupt changes in the 
markets their investments are located (national and international). Consequently, the 
flow of information, liquidity of the assets and world integration (liberalisation) of financial 
markets also makes them more susceptible to short and medium-term changes that can 
affect all the market players, which nowadays are everyone 
 
2.1.4 Main Street (makers) vs Wall Street (takers) 
Roger Martin (2011) argues in his book Fixing the game: Bubbles, Crashes and What 
Capitalism Can Learn from NFL that one of the side effects of applying Jensen and 
Meckling model to the Corporations is that these started to participate in two different 
markets: 
 The real market – where physical factories exist, products are produced and 
developed, goods are bought and sold.  
 The expectations market – This is the market where the Corporations shares are 
traded between investors. In this market investor evaluate the corporations based 
on their expectations. If they believe that one corporation will do well they will buy 
or hold that corporation stock. If they think otherwise they will not buy or sell that 
corporation stock. 
Rana Foroohar (2016) also makes a reference to such markets with an analogy between 
Main Street (the real market) and Wall Street (the expectations market). Both Martin 
(2011) and Foroohar (2016) point that before the advent of principal agent theory 
managers were solely focused on the “real market”, while the expectations market had 
very little importance. Managers were focused in making “real market” profits, trading 
goods and services, developing new, more efficient and more attractive products, 
increasing the number of customers and their satisfaction. Thus, creating long term value 
and producing a positive-sum game for the society. Additionally, managers salaries were 
composed almost entirely of a base salary and incentives connected to the “real market” 
performance (Jensen, et al., 2004). 
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After 1970 the way managers and directors were rewarded faced a complete change. 
The increased importance of financial markets and the hostile takeover market that 
developed in the 1980s started to create pressure to keep the share price high. 
Corporations with large cash reserves or low share prices become targets for being 
acquired by other corporations. Consequently, managers changed their focus to “Wall 
Street” numbers (Share-price, Earnings-per-share, dividends etc.) rather than real 
market performance indicators (volume of sales, profit, R&D, etc.) (Martin, 2011). 
Furthermore, managers total remuneration increased drastically, from nearly 1 million 
USD to 14millin USD in 2000 with the increase in popularity of stock-based rewards 
(Jensen, et al., 2004). As result of the shift from “Main Street” to “Wall Street” business 
become much more similar to a zero-sum game where for every “dollar” earned there is 
a “dollar” lost (Martin, 2011). 
Example of such shift is given by Rana Foroohar (2012). The big pharmaceutical 
company Pfizer had in 2015 more than 30 billion USD in cash stated in their balance 
sheet. One would think that such amount of the cash would be used in the real market, 
to improve the already known drugs, or instead in the researching and development of 
new innovative and life-saving rugs. In its place, the corporation bought a company in 
Dublin to reduce the amount of taxes paid in the United States and it is using the cash 
reserves in merges and acquisitions that drive share price up and lead to higher 
shareholder value (Foroohar, 2016).  
In short, the “real” market gives a better purpose to the corporation and produces a 
positive impact in the society (Martin, 2011). Positive-sum game lead to the creation of 
true value (in the form of new products and services) resulting in happier customers, 
happier employees. Thus, the classification of “Makers” for the corporations that act in 
this Market. The “expectations” market, except for the Initial Public Offer (IPO), is very 
close to be zero-sum game. The purpose of the corporation is solely increase the 
shareholder value. This value is usually created at the cost of gaining advantage over 
the trading partners. As result, all the stakeholders of the corporation are seen as mere 
instruments to extract money from. Thus, the classification of the Corporations focused 
on the “expectations” markets of “takers” (Martin, 2011; Foroohar, 2016). 
2.2 Corporate Governance 
The term Corporate Governance refers to the “set of rules and mechanisms by which 
companies are directed and controlled”.  The definition it-self refers to the already 
mentioned principal-agent conflict between managers (directing actors) and 
8 
 
shareholders (controlling actors) that has been shaping business since the beginning of 
the modern corporation in the early 1900s and the presentation of the model in 1970s. 
Therefore, Corporate Governance is an attempt to mitigate these conflicts and balance 
the different interests of all stakeholders in the same direction (Lekvall, 2014).  
However, the way of addressing such conflicts has not been very successful (Fleckner 
& Hopt, 2013). Company scandals such as Enron, CityGroup, Talvivaara Mining 
Company in Finland continue to happen often and, together with the 2008 financial crisis 
have made clear that corporate governance have failed and that changes were needed 
to ensure companies are directed and controlled in the best possible way. As each 
country was impacted differently by the corporate scandals and financial crisis their 
answer to the crisis, and changes in Corporate Governance were also unique. Thus, 
making Corporate Governance a dynamic process in which each country developed its 
own model in response to its own unique conditions and factors (Fleckner & Hopt, 2013).  
Although Corporate Governance models are different from country to country each 
model usually identifies its key elements: 
 Players in the corporate environment, their responsibilities, their interaction and 
their rewards 
 Ownership structure, 
 Composition of the board(s), 
 Regulatory framework and legal requirements 
As stated before Corporate Governance is unique across the globe, however there are 
similarities across the systems which allow us to categorize them into two main models, 
these are one-tier and two-tier model. Moreover, lately due the economic and social 
success experienced by the Nordic countries attention has been directed to their own 
version of Corporate Governance as a model with potential to ensure long term success 
(Lekvall, 2014).  
 
2.2.1 Anglo-American Corporate Governance model – One tier model 
One important factor influencing Corporate Governance is the size of the stock market 
and the ownership structure of each country. In countries with more financialised 
capitalism like United States or United Kingdom the ownership tend to be highly 
dispersed through individual investors and the stock markets large (Aglietta & Rebérioux, 
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2005). In such cases Corporate Governance developed into a system that puts more 
emphasis on the creation of shareholder value where the shareholders take a passive 
role in company governance, known as Anglo-American model.  
As the name points out the Anglo-American model is characteristic of economies like 
United States or United Kingdom. These economies have highly developed capital 
markets where equity financing is a popular way for corporations to raise capital and 
exchange of ownership, in the form of public traded stocks is also popular and easy. 
Such characteristics make the ownership of companies highly dispersed and easily 
transferred, while the decision-making and supervision of those is concentrated in Board. 
Hence, the name one-tier model (Aglietta & Rebérioux, 2005).  
In one-tier model the power invested in the board is both managerial and supervisory. 
On the other hand, ownership is so highly dispersed (with the shareholder owning only 
a very small fraction of the company) that no single shareholder can or is willing to (in 
the case of institutional investor) to exercise ownership event though the general meeting 
of the one-tier model theoretically has total, superior power over the board. Additionally, 
due to the fact that ownership can be easily exchanged most of the shareholders tend to 
be short-term investor while giving up on any ownership role (Block & Gerstner, 2016). 
Such unbalance in the power creates problems in aligning the interests of shareholders, 
managers and directors. Making the board almost exclusively responsibly for all the 
governance without strong shareholders to control it. True control is then left to the 
market itself under the assumption that well-performing companies will increase their 
share price while non-performing companies will have their share price decreased and 
therefore threatened by the possibility of takeover (Fleckner & Hopt, 2013). 
 
2.2.2 Continental Europe Corporate Governance model 
In high contrast in continental Europe the ownership of companies tends to be more 
concentrated and dominated by entities managing long-term capital like families, 
foundations or pension funds, and where the stock markets are smaller. Corporate 
Governance has developed into a model where these entities take an active role on 
deciding company behaviour, known as the two-tier model (Lekvall, 2014). 
Continental Europe Corporate Governance differs from Anglo-American model by 
making a clear separation of ownership, supervisory and managerial powers (Lekvall, 
2014). This system suggests the creation of a supervisory board with the power to 
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appoint or dismiss executive directors and with the power to veto some proposals of the 
executive board (when such happens the executive board can still bring the matter to 
the General Meeting for a final decision). Additionally, the size of the board is set by law 
depending on the corporation size, cannot be changed and includes employee 
representatives (Block & Gerstner, 2016). 
A General Meeting has very limited decision-making in matters regarding Corporate 
Governance. Instead the powers of the General meeting are appointing non-employee-
representing members of the supervisory board and adopting the annual accounts of the 
company. Additionally, in the countries where such a model prevails ownership is more 
concentrated. Shareholders with a high percentage of voting rights are more common, 
therefore more capable of exerting their powers (Lekvall, 2014). 
Finally, the system confers to the management board the governance power, thus trying 
to protect it from influence of the supervisory board and General Meeting in managerial 
matters as both in the supervisory board and in the General Meeting have limited power 
over each other and no one can serve in both boards at the same time (Block & Gerstner, 
2016; Lekvall, 2014). 
This model seems to perform better in aligning interests of executives and shareholders 
by balancing better the powers in the company.  
 
2.2.3 Corporate Governance in the Nordic countries. 
Lekval et all (2013) describe Corporate Governance model in the Nordic countries as 
distinctly different from one-tier and two-tier model in three major points. 
1. It defines a clear hierarchy between General Meeting, Board of Non-Executive 
directors and Executive Managers. The General Meeting is at the top of the chain, 
it is vested with absolute power of majority over the next governing body the 
Board of Non-Executive directors. 
2. The board is appointed by the General Meeting and can be dismissed at any time 
without a stated cause. Their members are not employees of the company or 
affiliated with it.  They are vested with far reaching powers such as appointing 
and dismissing the board of executives and advising them. Similarly, to the two-
tier model they have look alike “supervisory powers”, however they can be more 
easily appointed and dismissed. Thus, ensuring subordination to the will of the 
shareholders and accountability to them. 
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3. The board of executives have the managerial power. As stated they are 
appointed by the upper level and can also be dismissed at any time. Thus, once 
more ensuring subordination and accountability. 
Companies in the Nordic countries have traditionally concentrated ownership structures. 
This model grants to the strong owners’ great powers to actually control the board and 
executives. Therefore, the controlling shareholders are capable of having the company 
running according their interests. Such owners are usually active, the management 
competent, and have resources invested (such as money or time), therefore are involved 
with the management of its company which is a good indicator of long-term value 
creation for all the stakeholders (Lekvall, 2014). 
2.3 Contextualisation in Finland – The Financial System in Finland 
2.3.1 1970s and mid-1980s - Credit-based finance   
After the Second World War Finland was a step behind the other Nordic countries in 
terms of industrialisation and development of its economy.  In the 1970s and 1980s 
Finnish Economy was dominated by the Forest, heavy metals and steel industries. These 
are industries that require large and continuous capital investments and take a very long 
period to pay back (Korkeamaki, et al., 2013). The Forest Industry was especially 
important for the Finnish economy and described as an international success (Lilja, et 
al., 1994). Despite its small size and remote geographical location, Finland was able to 
maintain a stable market share of the world exports on paper products amounting in 1989 
to 14.4%. Success was only possible because of the earlier large capital investments in 
machinery and product development, and because of the patience of the investors that 
understood that returns would only be possible to obtain from the long-term growth of 
the value of the company (Lilja, et al., 1994). 
With such industries dominating the Finnish Economy, any individual that would want to 
invest in Finland would have to recognise the constant need of large capital investments 
and the long pay-back period on these (Lilja, et al., 1994). As a result in the 1970s and 
1980s capital was scarce, hard to secure and had to be obtained from commercial banks 
in the form of long term loans. Furthermore, the financial market was highly regulated. 
Foreign ownership of Finnish companies was limited to 20%, short-selling was forbidden, 
the Government controlled the capital flows across the borders, the interest rates on 
bank deposits and loans had ceilings set up by the Central Bank and the banks had strict 
limits on their lending quantities. Additionally, taxation was also favourable for debt 
financing. Capital gains and dividends were normally taxed while interest income from 
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government, bank mortgages and deposits bellow the interest celling were tax exempt 
(Korkeamaki, et al., 2013). Consequently, the regulations and taxations encouraged 
banks to create close relations instead of competing for market share, making the stock 
market less attractive and encouraging debt-financing. 
Companies and Investors understood that the key to secure capital was through the 
development of good relationships with the commercial banks. On the other side, banks, 
which had limits on how much they could lend, wanted to lend only to the most promising 
or stable companies as a loan to the wrong partner could easily harm the bank in a 
permanent way. Therefore, the high demand for loans and the limited supply of capital, 
created favourable conditions for the banks to carefully select the less risky companies 
to lend capital to and even to influence their strategy (Korkeamaki, et al., 2013). In fact, 
it was not uncommon for the CEOs of the Finnish banks to integrate the company’s board 
of directors to which they have lent capital to. In addition to the financial support it was 
common for the banks to provide also management support. Thus, creating a co-
dependent relation with the companies and banks being dependent on each other 
success as their return could only be collected by increasing the company long term 
value. The financial system in Finland highly resembled the situation in Germany where 
ownership was concentrated in the commercial banks through debt and differed quite 
from the Anglo-American financial markets (Korkeamaki, et al., 2013; Lilja, et al., 1994). 
 
2.3.2 Mid-1980s to 2000 – deregulation period and shift on ownership structure 
The circumstances of the Finnish economy, namely the low interest rates, favourable 
taxation on debt and the high inflation resulted in an excess of demand for loans that the 
banks could not satisfy. From 1985 onwards thorough the 1990s, the Finnish financial 
market faced a de-regulation period that led to the development of a modern capital 
market which is today Helsinki stock Exchange. The entrance to the European Union, 
the membership of EEA and the “liberalisation trend” seen in the international economy 
had a major role in opening the Finnish Economy and making it more attractive to foreign 
investments. The limits on interest rates and loans were gradually lifted and restrictions 
on foreign ownership was removed, restrictions on capital movements were removed 
and business sectors that were once protected by the state were open for competition 
(Jakobsson & Korkeamäki, 2014). 
Capital became easier to acquire and the banks that before had no competition had to 
compete with financial institutions. In order to compete with the new market players 
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banks became less strict in their loans, expanded their borrowing to riskier partners, and 
started to participate in high risk activities in which they had little to no experience such 
as company takeovers or investment in foreign assets, consequently the long-term 
relations that before drive the banks strategy lost importance. Ultimately, these actions 
would lead to the Finnish banking crisis of 1991-1993 (Jonung, 2008).  
The post-crisis period was marked by a reduction of the banks’ ownership of Finnish 
companies. The banks faced liquidity problems and were forced to sell part of the stock 
they had. Additionally, the new Basel rules classified the corporate bonds as high-risk 
assets, which made the corporate bonds less attractive and more expensive to hold 
(Jonung, 2008). 
The reduction of ownership of corporate bonds by the banks and the market de-
regulation opened space for international investors to enter the Finnish market. On figure 
1  we can see the ownership by commercial banks in the Finnish companies from 1987 
to 2011. Figure 2 shows the percentage of foreign shareholders from 1995 to 2015. From 
the graphs we can see that shortly after the banking crisis and the reduction of ownership 
by the banks the foreign ownership increased, reaching its peak, 73.9%, in 2001 
(Jakobsson & Korkeamäki, 2014). 
 
Figure 1-Ownership by commercial banks among Finnish listed firms 1987-2011 (Jakobsson & 
Korkeamäki, 2014) 
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Such internationalisation led to more and more transnational investments towards and 
outwards of Finland. As result companies from different countries, with different 
corporate cultures, started to work with Finnish companies on a regular basis. 
Companies that were used to working in very different contexts had to meet middle 
ground and work in conformity towards a shared objective. Not surprisingly pressure to 
adopt international standards to ease up business and reduce conflict between the 
different management styles, different company culture and different ownership models 
grew in Finland.   
 
2.3.3 2000s to present – modernisation and integration of the Finnish market 
During the late 1990s and early 2000s FDI in Finland has grown exponentially as a direct 
result of the liberalisation and internationalisation of the financial markets, the elimination 
of restrictions on foreign ownership, and the removal of limits on the flow of capital.  
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Figure 2 - Foreign Ownership Finland 1995-2015 
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Figure 3 - FDI net Finland 1970-2016 – source World Bank 
 
This internationalisation of business inevitably creates pressure to adopt International 
standards and align corporate governance world-wide. Due to the leading role that 
economies like United States and United Kingdom have in the world financial markets, 
their corporate governance model (the Anglo-American model) has been set as “model 
to follow”. (Jakobsson & Korkeamäki, 2014). In Europe, especially in the European 
Countries, European Commission has been the main force driving the adoption of 
international standards. Directive 2013/34/EU sets the common reporting standards for 
listed companies and the European Commission recommendation from April 2014 
(2014/208/EU) on the Quality of Corporate Governance Reporting (“comply or explain”) 
aims to implement across the EU country members a corporate governance code aligned 
with the “comply or explain” principle. 
3 Research question and methodology 
During courses such as Corporate Finance, Corporate Strategy or Competitive 
Intelligence shareholder value has always been a recurring topic. It has often been 
referenced to be generally used as a measure of company success and one, if not the 
only, goal of a business itself.  However as pointed before, such focus in wealth 
maximisation has the potential to be harmful for the organisation and to jeopardise the 
company long term success. With the raise of such concerns Corporate Governance has 
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become more and more important and has become the means by which shareholder 
value is, or not enforced in the companies. 
Even though Anglo-American Corporate governance model is now widely spread across 
the globe Nordic countries have been known for having a strong ownership model where 
the shareholders take active participation in the company decisions and strategy. 
Nevertheless, there have been some claimants such as Mähonen (2013) that describes 
Finnish corporate governance as “Nordic tradition with American spices“ suggesting that 
Finland is moving apart from the other Nordic countries and continental Europe towards 
the Anglo-American corporate governance model. Furthermore Airaksinen et al., (2014) 
and Jakobsson & Korkeamäki (2014) describe the ownership structure in Finland as 
mixed without a clear dominant model. The purpose of this paper is to provide further 
evidence about the corporate governance model of Finland by the Finnish Corporate 
Governance code and by analysing the ownership structure, and how it has changed 
over the last years, of the companies listed in the OMX Helsinki 25 index. 
3.1 Sample in study 
The sample in study is composed by the 25 companies listed in OMX Helsinki 25 on April 
2018 which consists of the 25 most traded companies in Helsinki stock exchange. The 
companies are described on table 1 in terms of market capitalisation, sector, number of 
employees and cap. size. To note that the companies on the table 2 are listed in more 
than one stock exchange market and must comply with more than one corporate 
governance code.  
The 25 chosen companies represent 19.53% of the 128 companies listed in Helsinki 
Stock Exchange, and 18.38% of the 136 listed shares (some companies such as Kesko 
Oyj have two classes of shares listed), 4 companies are traded in more than one market 
(16% of the sample) and 7 have a dual share system in practice (28% of the sample) -
see Table 3. 
They all are large cap companies except for Oututec Oyj that is part of the mid-cap 
segment. These were chosen because they are currently the most traded shares and 
therefore they represent the companies’ shareholders are paying more attention to. 
Additionally, due their market size they are seen as example in corporate governance 
practices and due their soft power they set the standards for all the other smaller 
corporations. Therefore, I believe the sample is representative of the Finland’s corporate 
governance.  
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Table 1 - Companies in study 
Company Market Cap  
Million EUR 
Sector Number of 
employees 
Segment 
Amer Sports Oyj 3,008 Personal & Household Goods 8,607 Large 
Cargotec Oyj 2,309 Industrial Goods & Services 11,251 Large 
Elisa Oyj 6,032 Telecommunications 4,715 Large 
Fortum Oyj 16,088 Utilities 10,585 Large 
Huhtamäki Oyj 3,795 Industrial Goods & Services 17,417 Large 
Konecranes Oyj 2,722 Industrial Goods & Services 16,371 Large 
Kesko Oyj B 4,366 Retail 23,863 Large 
KONE Oyj 18,174 Industrial Goods & Services 55,075 Large 
Metsä Board Oyj B 3313 Basic Resources 2,369 Large 
Metso Oyj 3,984 Industrial Goods & Services 12,037 Large 
Nordea Bank AB  34,141 Banks  30,399 Large 
Neste Oyj 13,840 Oil & Gas 5,366 Large 
Nokia Oyj 26,755 Technology 101,731 Large 
Nokian Renkaat Oyj 4,515 Automobiles & Parts 4,635 Large 
Orion Oyj B 3,699 Health Care 3,464 Large 
Outotec Oyj 1,349 Industrial Goods & Services 4,146 Mid 
Outokumpu Oyj 2,527 Basic Resources 10,225 Large 
Sampo Oyj A 25,601 Insurance 9,418 Large 
Stora Enso Oyj R 13,105 Basic Resources 25,700 Large 
Telia Company 15,882 Telecommunications 20,881 Large 
Tieto Oyj 2,097 Technology 14,329 Large 
UPM-Kymmene Oyj 15,937 Basic Resources 19,335 Large 
Valmet Oyj 2,529 Industrial Goods & Services 12,268 Large 
Wärtsilä Oyj Abp 10,946 Industrial Goods & Services 18,065 Large 
YIT Oyj 1,371 Construction & Materials 5,427 Large 
Source: Nasdaq, 18-04-2018 
Market cap includes only the listed shares in OMX Helsinki 
 
Table 2 – Companies listed in more than one stock exchange  
Company Other markets listed 
Telia Company Helsinki, Stockholm 
Stora Enso Oyj R Helsinki Stockholm 
Nordea Bank AB Helsinki, Stockholm, Copenhagen 
Nokia Oyj New York, Paris 
Source: Nasdaq, 18-04-2018 
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Table 3 - Companies with dual class shares  
Company name Share class and votes Share class and votes 
Cargotec Oyj A – 1 votes B – 1/10 votes 
Kesko Oyj A – 10 votes B – 1 votes 
Kone Oyj  B – 10 votes A – 1 votes 
Metsä Board Oyj A – 20 votes B – 1 votes 
Orion Oyj A – 20 votes B – 1 votes 
Sampo Oyj  B – 5 votes A – 1 votes 
Stora Enso Oyj A – 1 vote R – 1/10 votes 
3.2 Topics in Study 
3.2.1 Corporate Governance structure in use 
Companies were classified according the board structure in use from 2008 to 2017. They 
were either classified into a one-tier structure or two-tier structure according the definition 
provided above (Hopt, 2013): 
 One tier board structure: One board structure where the board has both control 
and supervision powers. 
 Two-tier board structure: clear division of control and supervision power into two 
boards. The supervisory board and the management board. 
 
3.2.2 Ownership structure: 
 Presence of strong/major shareholders –The criteria that qualified the 
shareholder as major shareholder was the one provided by the Finnish 
Corporate Governance code which states: 
(…)a shareholder who holds at least 10% of all company shares or the votes carried 
by all the shares. (Finnish Corporate Governance code 2015, page 26) 
 Presence of majority shareholder – As controlling shareholders was considered 
any shareholder that held at least 50% of the shares or votes on the 31st of 
December of each year. 
 Concentration of ownership in the top 5 and 10 shareholders – total amount of 
shares or votes hold by the 5 and 10 largest shareholders 
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 Shareholders by category – Percentage of shares hold by households, Finnish 
institutions and Foreign entities. 
3.2.3 Compliance with the Finnish corporate governance code  
Compliance with the code was assessed by analysing the corporate governance 
statements issued by the company from 2008 until 2017. The number of deviations was 
documented, and the quality of the explanations analysed. The classification of the 
quality of the explanations requires qualitative evaluation and therefore subjectivity is 
present. To minimise the subjectivity of the explanations the same criteria used by Faure-
Grimaud et al. (2005) was applied. They conducted a large study in 2015 regarding the 
compliance with the corporate governance code in UK. In the total 245 non-financial 
companies listed in FTSE350 index were studied. The criteria used is shown in table 4.  
  
 
Table 4 - criteria used by Faure-Grimaud et al. (2005) to quantify the quality of the explanations 
provided when departing from the corporate governance code. 
Qualitative classification  Quantitive score 
No Explanation 0 
General – A general or non-specific explanation. Ex: ”In the company best 
interest” 
1 
Inline – General reason that repeats words from the Corporate Governance 
code recommendations. EX: “remuneration committees should, within legal 
constraints, tailor their approach in individual early termination cases to the 
wide variety of circumstances” 
2 
Limited -  n explanation which provides more information than General or 
Inline but still falls short. Ex: “guaranteeing long term projects” 
3 
Transitional - A n explanation which points to a transitional situation. Ex: 
“unforeseen resignation of a director or an internal restructuring arising due 
to a merger”. 
4 
Genuine – Explanation that is specific for the company and motivated in 
detail and also the information given is verifiable.  
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The data was gathered from the companies’ Corporate Governance statements/annual 
reports released between 2008 and 2017. On total 241 governance statements/reports 
were analysed. 
The corresponding ownership structure data was collected from the “shareholders” 
website section of the companies in study. The information is usually public and 
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accessible under the section Investor Selections > Shareholders > Major 
Shareholders/Ownership structure. The companies provide an archive where all the 
major shareholders are listed once a month on the last day of the month. For this report 
the data was collected from the archive reports for the 31st of December of each year. 
When such file was not available the information was gathered from the company annual 
report for that year. On total 241 reports were analysed. 
4 Results and analysis - Finnish Corporate Governance Code 
The first recommendation on Corporate Governance was issued in 1997 by the Central 
Chamber of Commerce and Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers aiming to 
increase the transparency of the Finnish firms by providing investor with better 
information. Since then the code was revised on 4 occasions. The first in 2003 by the 
same entities and with the additional input of Hex Ltd, which is currently NASDAQ OMX 
Helsinki Ltd, to further increase the transparency of Finnish firms to investors, and to 
include for the first time a recommendation on the independence of directors. The second 
time in 2008 by the Securities Market Association (a cooperation body between 
established in December 2006 by the Confederation of Finnish Industries EK, NASDAQ 
Helsinki Ltd (the Exchange) and Finland Chamber of Commerce that become 
responsible between other tasks to issue the corporate governance codes in Finland) 
with the goal to keep the transparency of Finnish companies and empower shareholders’ 
rights. The third time in 2010 to answer the Financial crisis of 2008/9 (Securities Market 
Association, 2010). The latest revision was issued in 2015. 
4.1 The regulatory framework 
At the national level Finnish Listed Companies are regulated by the applicable Finnish 
Law, namely the Limited Liability Companies Act, the Securities Market Act, the Auditing 
Act, and the Accounting Act. Furthermore, public listed Finnish companies must comply 
to the relevant EU law the Helsinki Stock Exchange rules and finally to any regulations 
issued by the Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority (Airaksinen, et al., 2014). Finally, 
the Corporate Governance code complements the any obligations set by the Finnish law 
with recommendations on “good corporate governance”. 
The Limited Liability Companies Act sets the rules how the company is organised and 
operates. These rules apply to board of directors, managing director and Shareholders 
and define for each their responsibilities and how they interact. To note that the Limited 
Liability Companies Act is not fully mandatory and deviation from some of its guidelines 
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can be negotiated between the shareholders and approved by a qualified majority. The 
regulations set by the Securities Market Act, the Accounting Act and the Auditing Act are 
mandatory and regulate respectively the issuing and trade of shares, the accounting 
records and financial statements, and the audit of these. The Helsinki Stock Exchange 
and the Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority act as supervisory and disciplinary 
bodies by issuing administrative sanctions or fines when the companies fail to comply 
with the mandatory regulations. Last but not the least control of the company is left to 
strong shareholders or the market when the ownership is dispersed (Airaksinen, et al., 
2014).  
The latest version of the Finnish Corporate Governance Code was issued in 2015 
following the European Commission recommendation of April 2014. In the newer version 
the code contains 28 recommendations (down from 55 in the previous version of the 
code), 2 reporting guidelines and puts more emphasis on the “comply or explain” 
principle (Securities Market Association, 2015). These recommendations are not 
mandatory. However the public listed companies are expected to comply or to provide 
an explanation according the Securities Market Association guidelines when departing 
from the code. Despite its non-mandatory characteristic, compliance with the code in 
Finland is high with the companies featuring on average less than one deviation 
(Airaksinen, et al., 2014). 
According to its authors, a working group of 8 persons from different industries and 
associations (Hannes Snellman Attorneys Ltd, Metsä Group, Alma Media Corporation, 
Kesko Corporation, Finland Chamber of Commerce, Confederation of the Finnish 
Industries, NASDAQ Nordic and Ilmarinen Mutual Pension Insurance Company), the 
code core principles are: communication with shareholders, majority ruling, equal 
treatment, Strong Minority Rights and Transparency (Securities Market Association, 
2015). Also according its authors the “The objective of the Corporate Governance Code 
is to maintain and promote the high quality and international comparability of corporate 
governance practices applied by Finnish listed companies. Good corporate governance 
supports the value creation of Finnish listed companies and their attractiveness as 
investment objects.”.  – Finnish Corporate Governance Code 2015, page 9 
4.2 General Meeting 
The General Meeting is the highest decision body of the company. Shareholders vote 
according their voting powers on matters defined by the Limited Liability Companies act. 
Table 1 presents the matters on which Shareholders can vote. The meeting is held once 
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a year. The decisions are based on a simple majority meaning that at least 50% of the 
votes are required to approve a proposal, therefore promoting active participation of the 
shareholders and strong ownership. The Finnish code also promotes the protection of 
minority shareholders, in issues such as amendments of the company’s articles or share 
issues a qualified two-thirds majority is required to approve a decision. Additionally, when 
holding at least 10% of the company’s shares shareholders have certain rights. Strong 
minority rights aim to protect the minority shareholders from exploitation from the strong 
shareholders and to not frighten away potential investors. Table 2 resumes the rights of 
minority shareholders (Securities Market Association, 2015; Mähonen, 2013; Airaksinen, 
et al., 2014) 
Table 5 - Matters on which shareholders can exercise their power 
1. Remuneration, appointment and discharge of the board of directors 
2. Adoption of the company financial statements 
3. Distribution of assets 
4. Discharge from liability of executives  
5. Amendments of the company articles 
6. Decisions relating to the company’s shares and capital 
Source – Finnish Corporate Governance Code 2015 
 
Table 6 - Minority shareholders rights 
1. Demand an extra General Meeting 
2. Demand a minority dividend to be distributed 
3. Demand that decisions concerning the adoption of the company’s financial statements, 
the distribution of assets and the discharge from liability of the directors and managing 
director be deferred to a continuation meeting 
4. Bring an action against the company’s directors, the managing director, or another 
shareholder for the payment of damages to the company 
5. Propose that a special audit be carried out 
Source – Finnish Corporate Governance Code 2015 
 
As the shareholders are called to exercise their voting rights in the General Meeting it is 
relevant include under the General Meeting Topic an analysis of the ownership structure 
in Finland. 
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4.2.1 Ownership Structure 
4.2.1.1 Presence of Major/Significant/Strong Shareholders 
Table 7 shows the frequency of major/significant shareholders over the last 10 years in 
the companies currently listed in Helsinki OMX 25. The number of major shareholders 
per company decreased from 0.91 in 2008 to 0.88 to 2017 representing a total decrease 
of 3.62% from 2008 to 2017 and a yearly average decrease of 0.41%. On the other hand, 
the number of companies without major shareholders has varied little. In 2017 7 
companies did not have any major shareholder (1 more than 2008) and the number of 
companies with at least one major shareholder increased from 15 to 18. However it is 
important to note that in the years 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 not all the 
companies were included. Tieto Oyj was excluded from 2008 because the information 
was not available, Valmet Oyj was excluded from 2008 to 2012 because the company 
did not exist at that time 
Table 7 - Major shareholders in the companies listed in Helsinki OMX 25 
 
Total 
companies 
companies 
without 
major 
shareholders 
Companies 
with at least 
one major 
shareholder 
Total major 
shareholders 
Average 
major 
shareholders 
per company 
2017 25 7 (28%) 18 (72%) 22 0.88 
2016 25 6 (24%) 19 (76%) 23 0.92 
2015 25 6 (24%) 19 (76%) 23 0.92 
2014 25 6 (24%) 19 (76%) 23 0.92 
2013 25 6 (24%) 19 (76%) 24 0.96 
2012 24 7 (29%) 17 (71%) 24 1.00 
2011 24 7 (29%) 17 (71%) 23 0.96 
2010 24 7 (29%) 17 (71%) 23 0.96 
2009 23 9 (39%) 15 (65%) 21 0.88 
2008 22 8 (36%) 15 (68%) 21 0.91 
 
One important characteristic from the Nordic countries, Finland included, is the use of 
Dual-Class share system (European Central Bank, 2005). Therefore, the results for the 
ownership structure are also breakdown by companies with dual-class of shares and 
single-class of shares in Table 8. 
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In the companies that had a dual-class of shares in the last 10 years the average number 
of major shareholders per company increased from 1.286 shareholders to 1.429 
shareholders per company. This represents an increase of 11.11% from 2008 to 2017.  
For companies with a single class of shares in the last 10 years the average number of 
shareholders has decreased from 0.750 to 0.667. This represents a decrease of 11.11% 
from 2008 to 2017. Table 12 summarises the results by year. In 2017 the companies 
with dual share system had on average 2.14 times more major shareholders than the 
companies with a single share system. 
Table 8 - Major shareholders by company. Dual share vs single share system  
Year Dual class of shares Single class of shares 
2017 1.429 0.667 
2016 1.429 0.722 
2015 1.429 0.722 
2014 1.286 0.778 
2013 1.286 0.833 
2012 1.286 0.882 
2011 1.286 0.824 
2010 1.286 0.824 
2009 1.286 0.706 
2008 1.286 0.750 
 
In terms of majority shareholders 5 companies had a majority shareholder from 2008 to 
2017. These were: 
 Cargotec Oyj  
 Fortum Oyj 
 Konecranes Oyj 
 Metsä Board Oyj 
 Neste Oyj 
Although Cargotec did not had a single shareholder with at least 50% of the votes it was 
considered to be majority controlled due the fact that the company is family owned and 
the family members control more than 50% of the votes. On 2017 the majority-controlled 
firms represented 20% of the companies listed in Helsinki OMX 25. Table 9 shows the 
findings regarding the prevalence of companies with majority shareholders. 
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Table 9 - Helsinki OMX 25 companies with majority shareholder 
Year 
Total 
companies 
Companies without 
majority shareholder 
Companies with 
majority shareholder 
2017 25 20 (80%) 5 (20%) 
2016 25 20 (80%) 5 (20%) 
2015 25 20 (80%) 5 (20%) 
2014 25 20 (80%) 5 (20%) 
2013 25 20 (80%) 5 (20%) 
2012 24 19 (79%) 5 (21%) 
2011 24 19 (79%) 5 (21%) 
2010 24 19 (79%) 5 (21%) 
2009 24 19 (79%) 5 (21%) 
2008 23 17 (78%) 5 (22%) 
 
4.2.1.2 Concentration of the ownership - Top 5 and top 10 shareholders according 
voting powers 
The average percentage of voting powers concentrated in the top 5 shareholders in the 
last 10 years has decreased from 36.21% to 33.11%. This represents a decrease of 3.10 
percentage points (33.11 - 36.21 = -3.10) and a decrease of 8.56% (-3.10 / 36.21 = - 
0.0856) in the voting powers concentrated in the top 5 shareholders from 2008 to 2017. 
Regarding the top 10 shareholders, the average percentage of voting powers 
concentrated in the top 10 shareholders has decreased from 40.25% in 2008 to 37.11% 
in 2017. This represents a decrease of 3.14 percentage points (37.11 – 40.25 =  -3.14) 
and a decrease of 7.80% (-3.14 / 40.25 = -0.0780) in the voting powers concentrated in 
the top 10 shareholders from 2008 to 2017. Table 10 and figure 4 summarise the results. 
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Table 10 - Ownership concentration on top5 and top 10 shareholders 
Year 
Total 
companies 
Year average  
top 5 Shareholders 
Year Average  
top 10 Shareholders 
2017 25 33.11% 37.11% 
2016 25 33.17% 36.93% 
2015 25 33.41% 37.20% 
2014 25 34.62% 38.71% 
2013 25 35.41% 39.77% 
2012 24 35.96% 40.16% 
2011 24 36.68% 41.15% 
2010 23 35.03% 39.12% 
2009 23 34.39% 38.61% 
2008 23 36.21% 40.25% 
 
 
Figure 4 - Voting rights on the top 5 and top 10 shareholders 
Furthermore, the companies with the Dual-class share system have maintained a higher 
average voting rights concentrated in the top 5 shareholders. The average voting rights 
concentrated on the top 5 shareholders has decreased from 53.23% in 2008 to 52.88% 
in 2017 in the companies with Dual-class share system. This is a reduction of 0.35 
percentage points from the 2008 value. 
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In the companies with single class share system the average voting rights concentrated 
on the top 5 shareholders decreased from 28.76% in 2008 to 25.42% in 2017. This is a 
reduction of 3.34 percentage points from 2008 value. 
From 2008 to 2017 the voting powers of the top 5 shareholders from single class share 
companies have decreased 9.5 times more than the voting rights concentrated on the 
top 5 shareholders of the companies with dual class share system. As final remark, on 
2017 the top 5 shareholders of the companies with dual-class share system listed in 
Helsinki OMX 25 had on average 2.08 times more voting rights than the companies with 
a single-share system. Table 11 shows the results breakdown. 
Table 11 - Top 5 shareholders average voting rights. Dual class share vs single share system 
Year Dual class share system Single class share system 
2017 52.88% 25.42% 
2016 53.15% 25.39% 
2015 53.02% 25.78% 
2014 53.28% 27.37% 
2013 53.07% 28.54% 
2012 53.53% 28.73% 
2011 53.10% 29.92% 
2010 53.09% 27.12% 
2009 53.32% 26.10% 
2008 53.23% 28.76% 
 
Regarding the voting rights concentrated in the top 10 shareholders. In the companies 
with a dual class share system the average voting rights concentrated on the top 10 
shareholders according voting rights has decreased from 57.50% in 2008 to 56.48% in 
2017. This is a reduction of 1.02 percentage points from the 2008 value. 
In the companies with single class share system the average voting rights concentrated 
on the top 5 shareholders decreased from 32.71% in 2008 to 29.58% in 2017. This is a 
reduction of 3.13 percentage points from 2008 value. 
From 2008 to 2017 the voting powers of the top 10 shareholders from single class share 
companies have decreased 3.06 times more than the voting rights concentrated on the 
top 10 shareholders of the companies with dual class share system. As final remark, on 
2017 the top 10 shareholders of the companies with dual-class share system listed in 
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Helsinki OMX 25 had on average 1.91 times more voting rights than the companies with 
a single-share system (Table 12). 
Table 12 - Top 10 shareholders average voting rights. Dual class share vs single share system 
Year Dual class share system Single class share system 
2017 56.48% 29.58% 
2016 56.91% 29.15% 
2015 56.78% 29.59% 
2014 57.23% 31.51% 
2013 57.72% 32.79% 
2012 57.89% 32.85% 
2011 57.64% 34.36% 
2010 57.37% 31.14% 
2009 57.65% 30.28% 
2008 57.50% 32.71% 
 
4.2.1.3 Ownership by the type of Shareholders 
The type of owners was divided into three classes. Companies have not always reported 
foreign and nominee registered shareholders separately, in fact most of the companies 
have reported these two classes under the same category. For that reason, foreign and 
nominee registered shareholders were classified as international shareholders. 
Furthermore, Nordea AB and Telia Company have been excluded from the sample for 
being Swedish companies, Stora Enso Oyj was also excluded for being both a Swedish 
and Finnish company. 
In regards of the results, international shareholders in the companies under study have 
increased from 44.03% in 2008 to 47.36% in 2017. It is important to note that the share 
of international shareholders decreased in the years 2009, 2010 and 2011 to the 
minimum value of 37.91% and then increased constantly to the maximum value of 
47.37% in 2017. 
Finnish households have maintained a stable level of ownership. From 2008 to 2017 
their share of ownership increased from 16.05% to 16.27%. 
Data regarding the other Finnish owners show a decrease from 39.92% in 2008 to 
36,37% in 2017. Also, it is worthy of note that Finnish shareholders have increased from 
2009 to 2011 reaching a maximum of 43.48% in 2011. And from 2011 decreased to a 
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minimum of 36.23% in 2016. Table 13 summarises the results while figure 5 provides 
the data visualisation of the results.  
 
Table 13 - Foreign ownership. Helsinki OMX 25 companies 
Year international  Finnish households Other Finnish 
2017 47.36% 16.27% 36.37% 
2016 47.00% 16.77% 36.23% 
2015 44.72% 17.60% 37.68% 
2014 42.93% 17.95% 39.12% 
2013 41.69% 18.15% 40.16% 
2012 39.49% 18.11% 42.40% 
2011 37.91% 18.61% 43.48% 
2010 40.72% 18.27% 41.00% 
2009 42.77% 17.84% 39.39% 
2008 44.03% 16.05% 39.92% 
 
 
Figure 5 - Share ownership by category. Companies Helsinki OMX 25 
4.2.1.4 Analysis ownership structure - Importance of major shareholders 
The Finnish corporate governance code defines a major/significant shareholder as the 
shareholders that hold at least 10% of the shares or when different cash flows and voting 
rights account for 10% of the voting rights. Dimson, et al., (2015) who studied 
shareholder engagement from 1999 to 2009 in the US, correlated active ownership with 
a positive market reaction. Therefore, strong and active ownership is recognised as one 
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key factor for company success, making it both desirable and beneficial. Nordic 
economies have been widely praised for both their corporate governance models and 
the active role their shareholders assume. However, based on the studied companies it 
seems that in Finland the number of strong shareholders per company has been 
decreasing in the last 10 years. Therefore, the data suggests that the Finnish companies 
are moving towards a model were dispersed ownership is common like United States or 
United Kingdom (Aglietta & Rebérioux, 2005).  
The data regarding the ownership concentration on the top five and top 10 also supports 
the claim that ownership is becoming more dispersed in Finland. This reduction means 
that major shareholders are gradually reducing their number of shares in the company, 
therefore also reducing their influence over the directors and managers of the 
companies. Although not at that point yet, a reduction in the ownership concentration will 
shift the control of the company from the strong shareholders to the directors and 
managers. 
A reduction in the number of strong shareholders carries implications for Corporate 
Governance in Finland. It indicates a change from a voice-based control model to a 
market control model. With less active and weaker shareholders it is less likely that these 
will exercise their powers over the company, thus the control shifts from the shareholders 
to the managers of the company, creating a clear division between ownership and control 
typically seen in countries like the United States and United Kingdom. In other words, 
without the power to influence the company shareholders change from being business 
owners to be investors that have invested in shares. Consequently their interests also 
change from the business itself to the share price they are holding (Kay, 2015). 
Furthermore, from the point of view of the investors, active ownership would carry extra 
costs for being an active shareholder. If a shareholder would practice active ownership 
in one company all the benefits of his or her efforts would be equally divided among all 
other passive shareholders, thus creating a problem of ”free riders”. In countries such as 
United States and United Kingdom where ownership is widely dispersed the free rider 
problem becomes more relevant. Managers are faced with thousands of shareholders in 
the General Meeting who act passively and rarely oppose their proposals. Therefore, 
shareholders do not exercise their decision-making powers, instead they are expecting 
to collect only the benefits from the managers’ diligence. As a result of being passive, 
the shareholders strengthen the principal-agent problem as at the same time, managers 
will also see the passive shareholders as “free riders” that only want to collect the benefits 
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of the managers’ efforts. Thus, creating a conflict over who deserves to collect the 
benefits generated by the company (Nurminen, 2005). 
In the Nordic countries the dual class share system is used to fight the problem of free 
riders and balance the interests of both shareholders and managers. The main idea 
behind the dual class share system is to fight passive ownership and encourage active 
and strong ownership of the company and strict control over possible opportunistic 
managers. In a dual class share system, the company issues two or more series of 
shares that usually carry different voting rights. Commonly, the company issues shares 
to the public that carry less voting rights, while one or more shareholders keep the shares 
that carry more voting rights, allowing them to keep control of the company while holding 
a lower number of shares. The purpose of the system is to keep control of the company 
in the hands of committed and motivated shareholders to better protect the company 
from becoming market controlled (European Central Bank, 2005; Nurminen, 2005).  
The findings show that in the companies with Dual class of shares the number of strong 
shareholders and the ownership concentration are higher - a good indicator of the 
presence of active and committed shareholders in those companies. However, in this 
respect Finland seems to be diverging from the Nordic coporate governance model 
where the dual share system is highly used. Jakobsson & Korkeamäki (2014) report a 
higher decrease in popularity of the Dual class share system in Finland compared to 
Sweden (Figure 6). Such a decrease in popularity can be observed in the increasing 
number of share unifications that took place in Helsinki stock exchange in recent years 
(see Table 14). 
 
Figure 6 - Percentage of listed firms with multiple share classes. 
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Table 14 - Share Unification in Helsinki Stock Exchange 2000-2015 
Company name Year Share class Share class 
Norvestia 2015 A - 10 votes B - 1 vote 
Yleiselektroniikka 2012 K - 10 votes A - 1 vote 
Vaahto Group 2010 K - 20 votes A - 1 vote 
Elcoteq 2010 K - 20 votes A - 1 vote 
Tamfelt 2009 K - 20 votes A - 1 vote 
Fiskars 2009 K - 20 votes A - 1 vote 
Wärtsilä 2008 A - 10 votes B - 1 vote 
Panostaja 2008 A - 20 votes B - 1 vote 
Julius Tallberg-Kiinteistöt 2007 A - 20 votes B - 1 vote 
Pohjois-Karjalan Kirjapaino 2007 A - 20 votes B - 1 vote 
Sanoma 2006 A - 20 votes B - 1 vote 
Efore 2004 K - 20 votes A - 1 vote 
Source: Nurminen, 2005 
 
Although the Dual class of shares promote strong ownership it also creates conflicts 
among the shareholders. Claessens, et al., (2002) points out that the asymmetry 
between cash flows and voting rights allows the strong shareholders to receive a 
disproportional amount of benefits at the cost of the minority shareholders know as 
private benefits as result investors would be less interested in investing in such 
companies thus resulting in a lower maket valuation. The decrease of Dual share 
systems in Finland is also a sign of change in the Finnish corporate governance. As seen 
from the companies in study, both the the number of major shaholders and the onwership 
concentration were higher on the companies with a dual class of shares. By reducing the 
number of companies with a dual share system the number of strong shareholders is 
also reduced. Consequently ownership among the Finnish listed companies becomes 
more dispersed. On the other side companies become more attractive to investor as the 
risk of major shareholders extracting private benefits at the cost of minorities is reduced 
as shown by the increase of foreign ownership 
4.3 Board of directors 
The Board of Directors has a wide range of competences summarised in Table 15. 
Essentially the board appoints the managing director and the terms of its services, such 
as remuneration length of the term etc., decides the company strategy and monitors the 
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managing director while the strategy is implemented. In order to exercise its decision-
making powers all the board members should have the opportunity to participate and at 
least half of the members be present. The decision is then made through majority. The 
Finnish governance code also defines as duties of the board of directors to guarantee 
that the board keeps it-self informed about the company situation and to act on the best 
interest of the company as an agent of the all the shareholders equally (Securities Market 
Association, 2015).  
Table 15 - Board of Directors duties 
1. Deciding on company strategy and monitoring its implementation 
2. Appointment and discharging of the managing director  
3. Deciding on the terms of the managing director services  
4. Deciding on merger and acquisitions 
5. Deciding on Financial arrangements 
6. Major contracts 
7. Investments 
Source – Finnish Corporate Governance Code, 2015 
  
The Finnish Corporate Governance code does not set any limits on the size of the board, 
however states that it should have members enough to ensure that all the duties of the 
board are carried out efficiently. The majority of the board members should be 
independent from the company and at least two should be independent of major 
shareholders. Criteria that define independence of the company and independence from 
major shareholders is shown on the table 16 and 17 respectively (Securities Market 
Association, 2015).  
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Table 16 – Independence of the Company 
1. The director has an employment relationship or service contract with the company; 
2. The director has had an employment relationship or service contract with the company 
in the last three years, and such employment relationship or service contract has not 
been temporary; 
3. The director receives, or has received during the past year, not insignificant 
remuneration for services not connected to the duties of a director, e.g. consulting 
assignments, from the company or members of the company’s operative management; 
4. the director belongs to the operative management of another corporation which has or 
has had during the past year a customer, supplier or cooperation relationship with the 
company, and such relationship is or has been significant to the other corporation; 
5. the director is, or has been in the past three years, the auditor of the company, a partner 
or an employee of the 
present auditor, or a partner or an employee in an audit firm that has been the company’s 
auditor in the past 
three years;  
6. the director belongs to the operative management of another company whose director 
is a member of the operative management of the company (interlocking control 
relationship). 
Source – Finnish Corporate Governance Code 2015 
 
 
Table 17 - Independence of Major Shareholders 
1. the director is a significant shareholder of the company or a director of a significant 
shareholder, or has a relationship such as referred to in sub-sections a) - b) above with 
a significant shareholder 
2. the director exercises direct or indirect control in a significant shareholder or is a director 
of a significant shareholder, or the director has a relationship such as referred to in sub-
sections 1. and 2.  From the previous table with a party who exercises direct or indirect 
control in a significant shareholder. 
Source – Finnish Corporate Governance Code 2015 
 
4.3.1 Results Board Structure in Finland 
The Empirical data collected shows that a unitary Board, One-tier system dominates the 
Corporate Governance of the companies listed in Helsinki OMX 25 over the last 10 years. 
Only two companies had a Two-tier system that in both cases was abolished and 
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changed to a One-Tier structure. These companies were Fortum Oyj which had a Dual 
board system comprised of board of directors and supervisory board until 2011 and 
Neste Oyj which also had a Dual board system comprised of board of directors and 
supervisory board until 2010. To note that from 2011 onwards the One-Tier board system 
completely dominated the governance of the companies in study. Table 18 summarizes 
the results from the study carried out. 
Table 18 - Board structure in the Helsinki OMX 25 companies  
Year 
One-Tier Two-Tier 
Total  share Total Share 
2017 25 100% 0 0% 
2016 25 100% 0 0% 
2015 25 100% 0 0% 
2014 25 100% 0 0% 
2013 25 100% 0 0% 
2012 24 100% 0 0% 
2011 22 96% 1 4% 
2010 21 91% 2 9% 
2009 21 91% 2 9% 
2008 21 91% 2 9% 
 
4.3.2 Analysis 
The dominance of the one-tier structure for Finnish companies is also recognised in the 
Finnish Corporate Governance code on the page 12, the code first states:  
“Almost all Finnish listed companies use the unitary board structure described in this 
section, in which the company’s administration is the responsibility of the board of directors 
and the managing director” (Finnish Corporate governance code 2015:12) 
And then states the following: 
“The two-tier structure is not common among Finnish listed companies, which is why 
supervisory boards are not discussed in more detail in the Corporate Governance Code.” 
(Finnish Corporate governance code 2015:12) 
The Finnish companies usually have 3 decision-making levels that are hierarchical 
between them with the Shareholders through the General meeting on the top, followed 
by the board of directors and the managing director at the bottom. Additionally, an Auditor 
is selected by the shareholders to monitor the company activities and report back to the 
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shareholders in the General meeting. The discussion about whether the unitary board or 
dual board system leads to better governance practices is ongoing all around the world. 
However, regardless of its effectiveness or not and in respects to the board structure, it 
seems that the Finnish model resembles more the One-tier governance model used in 
UK and United States than the Two-tier model typical of continental Europe.  
Another important point where Finland differs from other Nordic countries and continental 
Europe is the representation of employees on the Board. Finland is the only Nordic 
country where representation is not mandatory (Thomsen, et al., 2016; Fauver & Fuerst, 
2006). 
Although Finland uses a unitary board model it is important to state that it differs from 
the Anglo-American model by clearly separating shareholders, board of directors and 
management through a hierarchical relation. Management answers to the board of 
directors and the board of directors answers to the shareholders. At the same time each 
level has the power to appoint or dismiss the level they stand upon. Thus, the influence 
of management over the board is reduced when compared to the Anglo-American model.  
Furthermore, the Two-tier structure is neglected by the code that does not provide any 
recommendations regarding that model.  
Alignment with the Anglo-American model is attractive for the companies. It makes the 
company less bureaucratic, thus allowing faster decision-making processes, greater 
involvement of the board with the company and better flow of information between board 
and management. Additionally, alignment with international standards also makes the 
companies more attractive to international investors, therefore easing up the access to 
financing on the capital markets.  
However, alignment with Anglo-American model has other implications. With the board 
of directors both making the decisions and monitoring their implementation the 
supervision becomes weak. The same persons that make a decision chose the manager 
to implement and decide on whether that decision is good or bad. Consequently, such 
organisation creates space for opportunistic directors and managers. In the cases where 
there are no strong shareholders to discipline the board of directors these might collect 
benefits at the cost of the company’s long term future or at the cost of the shareholders; 
therefore, increasing the agency costs (Aglietta & Rebérioux, 2005). 
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4.4 Managing Director 
The Managing Director is responsible for the day-to-day management of the company. 
He or she conducts the company’s operations that should be aligned with the instructions 
received from the Board of directors. Due to its wide range of responsibilities, the 
managing director is the person that carries the best knowledge of company situation 
therefore making him crucial for the company success. Board decisions are usually 
based on the information and proposals provided by the managing director thus making 
him a key link between the company and the Board. Moreover, he or she might have 
additional responsibilities when the board decides (Finnish Corporate Governance Code, 
2015:39-41). 
The questionable actions of the managing directors that have focused on the 
expectations market performance instead of the performance on the real market have 
been pointed out as one of the reasons  for the financial crisis (Denning S, 2011; Martin, 
2011). When Enron scandal outburst in 2001 the company C.E.O. Jeff Skilling was the 
one to blame, more recently when the Facebook scandal regarding the abusive use of 
user data became public the Company C.E.O. Mark Zuckerberg was also the one to 
blame. In both cases the C.E.O.s have seated and testify in front of United States 
Congress to explain what happened and why they behave like that (Kuchler, et al., 2018; 
Martin, 2011). If such behaviour is recurrent it might not be cause but an effect, 
consequently what allows or who allows such behaviour is the real question to be asked.  
As stated C.E.O.s have a determinant role in corporate Scandals. Therefore, would be 
expectable that the Finnish Corporate Governance code would address that. However, 
the Finnish Corporate Governance code only has 3 recommendations which seem to be 
few and vague in its contents to address such important issue. 
The Finnish code only recommends that the managing director should not seat as 
chairman of the board and that its duties, responsibilities and areas of intervention should 
be should be clearly documented and approved by the board (Finnish Corporate 
Governance Code, 2015:39-41).  
Although is recommended that the C.E.O. should not be elected as chairman of the 
board there are no recommendations regarding him or her being part of the board of 
directors. In fact, that happens in some companies such as UPM Kymmene Oyj (UMP 
Kymmene Annual Report, 2017). Although the managing director is not alone in the 
board, when such happens the C.E.O. can participate in deciding on how he is rewarded 
and how his/her performance is evaluated. Therefore C.E.O. will be capable of 
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influencing the decision and secure better terms for his remuneration for example. Even 
in the cases that the C.E.O. is not part of the Board it is common to see C.E.O.s on the 
board of different companies. Therefore, indirectly they will be able to decide on other 
C.E.O.s remuneration schemes for example. If conditions that suit the C.E.O.s are 
practiced in other companies it will influence the remaining companies to do the same 
otherwise they will not be able to attract the most capable C.E.O.s. Concluding the 
Finnish Corporate Governance code seems to be short and vague in regards of 
recommendations concerning managing directors, furthermore due the fact C.E.O.s 
accumulate multiple roles in different companies allows them to influence other 
managing directors remuneration schemes thus creating the possibility for a “I scratch 
your back and you scratch mine” effect. 
4.5 Remuneration  
The latest revision of Finnish Corporate Governance Code reduced the number of 
recommendations concerning remuneration from 9 (in the Finnish Corporate 
Governance code of 2010) to 3 recommendations (2015 version). It starts by recognising 
that competitive remuneration is crucial to attract the best possible managers to the 
company. The remuneration of the board of directors and committees is decided on the 
General meeting, shareholders that are also board members can also vote on this 
matter. Nevertheless, voting on the remuneration should be done before electing the 
board of directors. The code suggests that the Board and committees should be paid 
partially or fully in the form of company shares, however it recommends that the shares 
must be retained during the term of the directors. Non-executive directors’ remuneration 
should be arranged separately from the share-based remuneration scheme. Board of 
directors decide on the remuneration of the Managing directors, other executives and 
personnel, in these cases a share-based remuneration can be applicable. According the 
code “the objective of remuneration is to promote the long-term financial success and 
competitiveness of the company and the favourable development of shareholder value.”. 
Additionally, a remuneration report must be published where the remuneration within the 
company is described. In the case the remuneration is paid on the form of company 
shares this must be retained by the recipients during the entire duration of its term 
(Airaksinen, et al., 2014; Mähonen, 2013; Securities Market Association, 2015). 
How to keep their employees motivated and to act on the company best interests has 
been a problem that have long accompanied corporation and described on the principal-
agency theory. The main assumption is that both the shareholders and managers will 
have their own interests placed in the top and that they will try to divert the benefits 
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generated by the company to their own side, thus reducing the other side amount. 
Finnish Corporate Governance code recommends share-base incentives to the directors 
and managers as mean to ensure the long-term success of the corporation. As pointed 
by Martin (2011) and Cable & Vermeulen (2016) share-based arrangements carry 
implications that might harm more the company that benefit it. Assuming the directors 
are driven by self-interest they might try to maximise the share value through all the 
means necessary, some of these not very ethical or even legal, thus the recurrent 
corporate scandals. One the value of the share is high, and their term is over (assuming 
the recommendation that suggest retaining the shares at least during the employment 
term is put in place) the logical action would be to cash the shares and pocket the profits 
before such actions ae discovered or pointed out. Additionally, Roger Martin (2011) also 
states that is common for new managers to start pointing out problems on the corporation 
to decrease the share price of the company and at the same time decrease the 
expectations the market has on them to give them extra space of manoeuvre during their 
term. 
Furthermore share-based rewards are focusing on the company performance, but 
possibly on the wrong performance. In this case Roger Martin (2011) also provides a 
good example on how share price does not reflect business operations. From 2000 to 
2010 Microsoft more than doubled their price, however its share-price in 2010 was lower 
than what it was in 2000. Although the company has an outstanding performance that 
few can achieve the stock market has expected from Microsoft to keep perfuming better 
than the year before creating an unsustainable pressure for higher results and 
expectations near to impossible to satisfy.  
Concluding, being remuneration a key point om the principal-agent theory it would be 
expectable from Finnish Corporate Governance code to address this matter more 
precisely and to provide precise recommendations on at least what should not be done. 
Instead in the code seems to fall short on the recommendations (three 
recommendations, down from nine recommendations), to encourage share-based 
remunerations and to give freedom on how to apply it. Share-based incentives might 
lead managers and directors to focus on the expectations market. Managers and 
directors have at their disposal a wide range of instruments, such as share buy backs, 
that have a positive effect on the share-price and a negative effect on the corporation. 
Moreover, by focusing on the performance on the expectations market the managers 
and directors expose the company to pressures and expectations that in order to be 
achieved require a cut somewhere else (usually on the customer satisfaction or real 
40 
 
market). Finally using the Foroohar (2016) analogy that classifies the companies as 
makers or takers by using share-based remuneration might change their activity from 
maker to taker. In my own words such schemes might incentive managers to “milk the 
cow exhaustively rather than feed it”. 
4.6 Implications of the present model 
As Roger Martin described in his book Fixing the Game Corporate Governance is in 
constant change. Shareholders, Employees, Directors, Managers, customers and in a 
larger scale society are all affected by the activities of the corporations. Therefore, all of 
these should have a say regarding corporate governance, however some of these are 
more powerful than the others and more capable of influencing corporate governance 
practices. Logically is expectable that they will exert such influence and shape the 
corporate governance codes to benefit their goals. 
In the case of Finland, the Finnish Corporate Governance recommendations were 
created by a group of work appointed by the Finnish Securities Market Association. The 
group was constituted by eleven members that have meet and consolidated the 
recommendations into a document, the “Finnish Corporate Governance code 2015”.  
The working group is comprised of individuals seen as experts with different 
backgrounds and from different associations and Industries. They were representing: 
 Hannes Snellman Attorneys Ltd (1 person) 
 Metsä Group (1 person) 
 Alma Media Corporation (1 person) 
 Kesko Corporation (1 person) 
 Finland Chamber of Commerce (2 persons) 
 Nasdaq Nordic (2 persons) 
 Confederation of Finnish Industries (2 Persons) 
 Ilmarinen Mutual Pension Insurance Company (1 person) 
 
At first this might seem as working group well diversified that will represent well the 
interests of all the stakeholders. However, when looking carefully it is noticeable the lack 
of employee representation. Employees are a fragile group that is highly affected by 
corporate governance. They are fragile in the sense that in general rule they highly 
depend on their salary and that at the light of the current economic circumstances being 
unemployed can lead to severe consequences mostly seen as a decrease in their quality 
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of life. With such sensitivity to corporate affairs it would be logical to have them 
represented while preparing the Finnish Corporate Governance Code. Without that it is 
questionable if their interests were included or even brought to the table. Another 
important point regarding employees is that the Finnish Corporate Governance Code 
only makes one reference to employees. On page 23 the code refers that in special 
cases employees might have the right to appoint a director to the board of directors. 
However, there is no reference if such is desirable or advisable. Concerning employees’ 
representation Finland seems to be divergent from other Nordic countries and 
continental Europe (Germany,  where employee representation is mandatory (Thomsen, 
et al., 2016). Furthermore Fauver & Fuerst  (2006) and Thomsen et al (2016)  suggest 
some benefits of small employee representation (about one third of the borad) such as 
less strykes and better firm performance. 
 
Also worthy to point is the majority of members (six out of eleven members) from 
organisations that promote international trade. These are Nasdaq Helsinki, Finland 
Chamber of Commerce and Confederation of Finnish Industries. NASDAQ core 
business is trading and listing of shares. Finland chamber of Commerce activities in the 
words of its Executive Vice President, International affairs Timo Vuori are: 
 
“We promote internationalisation, clear trade obstacles, influence international agreement 
systems, and support investment initiatives made by enterprises. Our networks reach all 
four corners of the globe. In addition, the chambers of commerce serve companies with the 
documentation necessary for foreign trade.”  (Finnish Chamber of Commerce Website, 
2018).  
And Confederation of Finnish Industries goal is:  
“Our main task is to make Finland an internationally attractive and competitive business 
environment. Successful business activities are the foundation for the Finnish welfare 
society.” (Confederation of Finnish Industries website, About us, 2018) 
Although from 3 different organisations it is logical to expect that these members will 
have similar, if not shared interests regarding corporate Governance. Their goals, 
although very different are similar in its core. They all promote internationalisation of 
trade by reduction of trade obstacles. In other words, their goal seems to be alignment 
of Finnish corporate governance with international standards to promote trade and attract 
investment. Although there is nothing wrong with that goals. the fact that 6 persons have 
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very similar goals and represent the majority of the working group might means that they 
could have been capable of influence the elaboration of the Finnish Corporate 
Governance code towards their interests. The latest revision of the Finnish Corporate 
Governance code issued in 2015 and in effect since 1st of January 2016 reduced the 
number of recommendations from 55 to 28. Additionally, it further enforced the “comply 
or explain” principle. At the first sight seems that 2015 version of the Finnish Corporate 
Governance code aligns well with the interests of the just pointed organisations. After all 
less recommendations mean less obstacles, enforcement of the “comply or explain” 
principle represents alignment with international standards. Thus, promoting 
international trade by making Finnish corporations more attractive to international 
investors. 
4.7 Compliance with the code – “comply or explain” principle 
4.7.1 Results 
In Finland, according to the rules of Helsinki Stock Exchange of NASDAQ OMX Helsinki 
compliance with the Corporate Governance code is mandatory for any listed company. 
However, the Comply or Explain principle allows the companies to depart from the code 
recommendations if there is a good reason for doing so. Furthermore, in its newest 
version the Finnish Corporate Governance code further enforces the “comply or explain” 
principle by reducing the number of recommendations and providing the structure for the 
explanations. Table 19 shows the elements required by the Finnish Corporate 
Governance code in the explanations given.  
 
Table 19 - Explanation elements required for each departure from the Corporate Governance 
code 
• an explanation of the manner in which the company has departed from a recommendation; 
• a description of the reasons for the departure; 
• a description of how the decision to depart from the recommendation was taken within the 
company; 
• where the departure is limited in time, an explanation of when the company envisages 
complying with a particular recommendation; 
• where applicable, a description of the measure taken instead of compliance and an 
explanation of how that measure achieves the underlying objective of the specific 
recommendation or of the code as a whole, or a clarification of how it contributes to good 
corporate governance of the company. 
Source – Finnish Corporate Governance Code 2015 
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Compliance with the code is first enforced by the shareholders in the General Meeting 
through their voting powers and then supervised by the Finnish Financial Supervisory 
Authority and Helsinki stock exchange who can impose sanctions to those who fail to 
comply with the code or fail to provide acceptable explanations. The Finnish Financial 
Supervisory Authority is especially active in supervising and enforcing good governance, 
it makes investigations on the possible code departures and can even bring criminal 
charges in the gravest cases (Airaksinen, et al., 2014). 
In total there are 241 documents comprising the corporate governance reports from the 
25 companies featured in this study. In total, deviations were found in 58 reports from 15 
companies and 89 deviations from the Finnish corporate governance code were reported 
from 2008 to 2017.  
The year with most reported deviations was 2008 with 15 and the years with least were 
2010 and 2015 with 6 reported deviations each. The average number of deviations 
reported by year decreased from 0.59 in 2008 to 0.28 in 2017, a cut of 47,46%  (Figure 
7). The number of deviations decreased on average 7,94% per year. Finally, for the last 
year in study only 7 deviations were reported, thus an average of 0.28 deviations per 
company in 2017.  Table 20 summarises the results of the study. 
 
Table 20 - Number of deviations from the Finnish Corporate Governance Code and quality of 
the explanations 
Year Total deviations 
Average deviations 
per company 
Average quality of 
the explanations 
2017 7 0.28 3.71 
2016 9 0.36 3.78 
2015 7 0.28 3.71 
2014 6 0.24 2.83 
2013 9 0.36 3.33 
2012 10 0.43 3.00 
2011 7 0.30 2.57 
2010 6 0.26 2.83 
2009 15 0.65 1.73 
2008 13 0.59 1.85 
Total 89 0.37 2.79 
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Figure 7 - Average number of deviations in the companies listed on Helsinki OMX 25 
Regarding the quality of the explanations, 25.84% were General answers, 33,71% were 
Inline, 4.49% were Limited, 7.87% were Transitional, and 28.09% of the answers were 
Genuine (Figure 9). The overall score of the answers was 2.79 points and the average 
quality of the answers improved from an average of 1.85 points in 2008 to 3.71 points in 
2017 an increase of 100.54% from 2008 to 2017 and a yearly increase of 8.03%. The 
maximum year average score was 3.78 points in 2017 and the lowest average was found 
in 2009 - see Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8 - Average quality of the explanations. Companies Helsinki OMX 25 
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Figure 9 - Quality of the explanations 
In this case the empirical data suggests that over the last 10 year the number of 
deviations among the companies listed in Helsinki OMX 25 index has decreased while 
the quality of the explanations has increased. 
4.7.2 Analysis 
The “Comply or explain” principle was introduced in United Kingdom in 1992 due to the 
previous failure of corporate governance in preventing corporate scandals such as Polly 
Peck in 1990 or Bank of Credit and Commerce International in 1991.  The purpose of 
the principle is to divert from the ineffective “one size fits all” approach, thus giving the 
companies flexibility in how to apply the code and to improve transparency through the 
explanations provided. Therefore, when necessary a company can diverge from the 
corporate governance recommendations without being sanctioned providing that it can 
provide and acceptable explanation. Consequently the “comply or explain” principle 
shifts the monitoring of good corporate governance from a market regulator to the hands 
of the shareholders and subsequently the market (Hadjikyprianou, 2015).  
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The effectiveness of this principle has been questioned and the poor monitoring 
performed by the shareholders or the quality of the explanations provided have been 
highlighted as its main limitations. The problem related with the shareholders is well 
known and recognised. In order to the principle to be effective it needs strong or active 
shareholders that can make the Board accountable, when the company fails to provide 
a satisfactory explanation, or even an explanation at all. However as described by Arcot, 
et al., (2005) who studied the effectiveness of the “comply or explain” principle in UK. 
“shareholders seem to be indifferent to the quality of explanations”. Typically, 
shareholders invest using portfolio theory, they diversify their portfolio by investing 
indifferent shares from different industries from different countries to minimise risk and 
maximise their profits. Thus, making it difficult if not impossible for them to monitor each 
one of their investments, furthermore in terms of returns, portfolio investments of 
complier companies did not exceed, significantly, portfolio investments of non-complier 
companies (Faure-Grimaud, et al., 2005). In other words, shareholders pay attention to 
Key performance indicators that are easy to follow such earnings per share, share price 
or net profits, consequently as their attention is on the performance rather than the 
explanation the “comply or explain” principle is transformed in “comply or perform” 
(Hadjikyprianou, 2015).  
When weak or passive shareholders are present monitoring is expected to be carried by 
the market that will penalise the companies that fail to comply with good governance 
principles through a lower share price. However, market control is not efficient because 
first the share price is not a true reflection of the company value or performance, second 
because share price is more sensitive to other key performance indicators such as net 
profit rather than bad governance practices. Therefore, making it possible for the 
companies to have a good share price while sustaining bad governance practices. 
A good example how shareholders or the market failed to penalise bad corporate 
governance and focus in other key performance indicators is the well known case of 
Enron. Even though the company constantly reported good financial results and its share 
price was increasing, the company collapsed in 2001 (Foroohar, 2016) (Martin, 2011) 
The second limitation, poor quality explanations, is connected to the poor monitoring. 
Poor monitoring allows poor explanations to be accepted. Faure-Grimaud et al. (2005) 
analysed and classified into 6 categories (see table 7) the quality of the reasons provided 
from a database of 245 non-financial firms in the period of 1994-2004. 17% of the non-
compliers companies did not provide any explanation, 26% provided a “general” 
explanation, 25% provided an “Inline” explanation. In total 68% were in the 3 lower levels 
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making them nonexistent, general or vague. For the sample in study this amounted for 
62% which is in line with the results found by . Faure-Grimaud et al. (2005). 
The problem with the quality of the explanations is recognised by the European 
commission with new recommendations made on its last Directive on Corporate 
Governance from April 2014 (2014/208/EU). One of the objectives of the 
recommendation is to improve the effectiveness of the “comply or Explain” principle, 
namely by improving the quality of the explanations provided. European Commission 
recommends mandatory adherence to the relevant corporate governance code and 
proposes a structure for the explanations on Section III paragraph 8.  
The results presented by Finland can be contradictory. Less number of deviations and 
higher quality of the explanations is at the first sight a sign of better governance. 
However, the main goal of the “comply or explain” principle is to allow the companies to 
depart from the code to improve their performance and competitiveness. Fewer number 
of deviations might be an indicator that the companies in Finland are blindly following the 
Corporate governance code and adopting a behaviour of ticking boxes rather than 
adapting to their market needs. This is a clear expectations market move as the 
companies are doing what the market expects them to do (comply with the code) rather 
than focus on what is better for their Operations. 
5 Final Discussion 
In the case of Finland, continental Europe has been the major target of Finnish 
investments. In the same way, majority of the foreign Investment in Finland is also 
coming from European Countries. Sweden particularly has been a long date trading 
partner due to the geographical proximity, the common origin of Corporate Law and the 
close politic and economic cooperation throughout the history of both countries. Not only 
in the past, but also in the latest years European Union countries, specially Sweden, 
represented the majority of Finland’s Inward foreign direct investment. In 2016, 91% of 
the foreign direct investment in Finland came from European Union countries, from which 
46% came from Sweden alone. On the other hand, 83% of the Finnish international 
investments in 2016 were directed to European Union countries while Sweden 
represented 23% of these. Figures 10 and 11 show the inflow and outflow of foreign 
direct investment in Finland by country of origin or destination from 2013 to 2016 further 
supporting the claim that European Union countries, and Sweden particularly, are 
important business partners for the Finnish economy.  
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Figure 10 - Finland's Inward FDI 
 
Figure 11 - Finland's Outward FDI 
With such proximity, and with the number of companies working with international 
partners increasing, it would be expectable to see convergence on the Corporate 
Governance models specially between Finland and Sweden.  
However, the findings of the present study suggest an alignment with the Anglo-
American and not with the Nordic model or continental Europe Governance. Finnish 
Corporate Governance Code seems to have at its core principles similar to the ones 
used in Anglo-America model. 
The First finding suggesting such alignment is the gradual reduction of ownership 
concentration, thus shifting from a market where ownership was traditionally 
concentrated to a market where dispersed ownership dominates. Although is not clear 
yet a dominant model it is safe to state that although Finnish ownership structure is not 
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dispersed yet it is definitely moving on that way. The ownership of the companies listed 
in Helsinki OMX 25 has become more dispersed in the last 10 years. The number of 
major shareholders has decreased, the concentration of voting powers on top 5 and top 
10 shareholders has gradually decreased over the last ten years and the governance 
model has attracted more foreign investors. Such changes approximate Finland towards 
countries like United Kingdom where the ownership of shares is widely dispersed.  
The second finding suggesting approximation to the Anglo-American model is the 
dominance of a One-tier Board system with supervisory and managerial power but 
without employee representation. In the last years of the study all the companies listed 
on Helsinki OMX 25 had a unitary board system in place that resembles the board used 
in Anglo-American model. Managing directors are allowed to be part of the board and  
The number of deviations from the Finnish Corporate Governance code has decreased 
and the quality of the explanations has increased. Although it might be a sign of good 
corporate practices among the Finnish Companies my analysis is that few number of 
deviations are an alarming sign. The idea of the “comply or explain” principle is to allow 
the companies to deviate from the code to deliver extra value to all stakeholders. By fully 
complying with the code companies are adopting the idea that one model fits all. 
As final remark, the ownership structure of the Listed Finnish companies is under an 
ongoing change as Ownership is becoming more dispersed, the number of major/strong 
shareholders is decreasing, and the presence of international shareholders is increasing. 
As turning point 2010 can be identified as marking the beginning of the change. The last 
Two-tier board system was abandoned in 2011 and One-tier boards dominated from that 
onwards. Foreign Ownership has declined until 2010 and from that year it increased 
reaching a maximum in 2017. Ownership concentration was stable during 2008, 2009 
and 2010 and from 2011 to 2017 it has decreased gradually both in the top 5 
shareholders and top 10 shareholders.  
The initial goal of the thesis was to study the ownership structure of the companies listed 
in Helsinki OMX 25 and how it has changes over the last 10 years to further provide 
evidence that supports or refutes the claims that the Finnish corporate governance model 
is moving towards the Anglo-American model. Both the analysis and the findings suggest 
that Finnish Corporate Governance is becoming aligned with the Anglo-American model 
of Corporate Governance.  
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7 Appendixes 
7.1  Major shareholders, results by company 
Company 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
Amer Sports Oyj 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Cargotec Oyj 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Elisa Oyj 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Furtum Oyj 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Huhtamäki Oyj 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Kesko Oyj 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kone Oyj  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Konecranes Oyj 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Metsä Board Oyj 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Metso Oyj 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Neste Oyj 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Nokia Oyj 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nokia Renkaat Oyj 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nordea Ab 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
Orion Oyj 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Outokumpu Oyj 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Outotec Oyj 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Sampo Oyj  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Stora Enso Oyj 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Telia Company 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Tieto Oyj 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 N.A. 
UPM Kymmene Oyj 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Valmet Oyj 1 1 1 1 1 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Wärtsilä 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
YIT Oyj 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Total 22 23 23 23 24 24 23 23 21 21 
Average 0.880 0.92 0.920 0.920 0.960 1.000 0.958 0.958 0.875 0.913 
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7.2 Majority shareholders, results by company 
Company 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
Amer Sports Oyj No No No No No No No No No No 
Cargotec Oyj Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Elisa Oyj No No No No No No No No No No 
Furtum Oyj Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Huhtamäki Oyj No No No No No No No No No No 
Kesko Oyj No No No No No No No No No No 
Kone Oyj  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Konecranes Oyj No No No No No No No No No No 
Metsä Board Oyj Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Metso Oyj No No No No No No No No No No 
Neste Oyj Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nokia Oyj No No No No No No No No No No 
Nokia Renkaat Oyj No No No No No No No No No No 
Nordea Ab No No No No No No No No No No 
Orion Oyj No No No No No No No No No No 
Outokumpu Oyj No No No No No No No No No No 
Outotec Oyj No No No No No No No No No No 
Sampo Oyj  No No No No No No No No No No 
Stora Enso Oyj No No No No No No No No No No 
Telia Company No No No No No No No No No No 
Tieto Oyj No No No No No No No No No N.A 
UPM Kymmene Oyj No No No No No No No No No No 
Valmet Oyj No No No No No N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Wärtsilä No No No No No No No No No No 
YIT Oyj No No No No No No No No No No 
Total  5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
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7.3 Board structure, results by company 
Company 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
Amer Sports Oyj 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 
Cargotec Oyj 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 
Elisa Oyj 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 
Furtum Oyj 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 2 tier 2 tier 2 tier 2 tier 
Huhtamäki Oyj 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 
Kesko Oyj 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 
Kone Oyj  1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 
Konecranes Oyj 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 
Metsä Board Oyj 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 
Metso Oyj 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 
Neste Oyj 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 2 tier 2 tier 2 tier 
Nokia Oyj 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 
Nokia Renkaat Oyj 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 
Nordea Ab 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 
Orion Oyj 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 
Outokumpu Oyj 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 
Outotec Oyj 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 
Sampo Oyj  1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 
Stora Enso Oyj 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 
Telia Company 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 
Tieto Oyj 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 
UPM Kymmene Oyj 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 2 tier 
Valmet Oyj 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Wärtsilä 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 
YIT Oyj 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier 1 tier N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
 
  
Appendixes    57 
 
7.4 Number of deviations from the Finnish Corporate Governance code, results by company 
Company 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
Amer Sports Oyj 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cargotec Oyj 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 N.A 
Elisa Oyj 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Furtum Oyj 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 
Huhtamäki Oyj 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kesko Oyj 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Kone Oyj  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Konecranes Oyj 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Metsä Board Oyj 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Metso Oyj 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Neste Oyj 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Nokia Oyj 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 
Nokia Renkaat Oyj 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nordea Ab 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Orion Oyj 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Outokumpu Oyj 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Outotec Oyj 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Sampo Oyj  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Stora Enso Oyj 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Telia Company 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Tieto Oyj 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
UPM Kymmene Oyj 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Valmet Oyj 0 0 0 0 0 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Wärtsilä 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
YIT Oyj 0 0 0 0 0 0 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Total 7 9 7 6 9 10 7 6 15 13 
Average 0.28 0.36 0.28 0.24 0.36 0.42 0.30 0.26 0.65 0.59 
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7.5 Quality of the explanations 
Company Year Recommendation 
Applicable 
code 
Quality of the 
Explanation Subject 
Quantitative 
score 
Cargetec Oyj 2013 29 2010 Transitional Committees 4 
Cargetec Oyj 2013 32 2010 Transitional Committees 4 
Cargetec Oyj 2012 26 2010 General Committees 1 
Cargetec Oyj 2012 29 2010 Transitional Committees 4 
Cargetec Oyj 2012 32 2010 Transitional Committees 4 
Stora Enso Oyj 2008 22 2008 Limited Committees 3 
Stora Enso Oyj 2008 28 2008 Limited Committees 3 
Stora Enso Oyj 2009 22 2008 Limited Committees 3 
Stora Enso Oyj 2009 28 2008 Limited Committees 3 
Kesko Oyj 2017 6 2015 Genuine board of directors 5 
Kesko Oyj 2016 6 2015 Genuine board of directors 5 
Kesko Oyj 2015 6 2015 Genuine board of directors 5 
Kesko Oyj 2014 10 2010 Genuine board of directors 5 
Kesko Oyj 2013 10 2010 Genuine board of directors 5 
Kesko Oyj 2012 10 2010 Genuine board of directors 5 
Kesko Oyj 2011 10 2010 Genuine board of directors 5 
Kesko Oyj 2010 10 2008 Genuine board of directors 5 
Kesko Oyj 2009 10 2008 Genuine board of directors 5 
Kesko Oyj 2008 10 2008 Genuine board of directors 5 
Fortum Oyj 2009 14 2008 General board of directors 1 
Fortum Oyj 2009 30 2008 General Committees 1 
Fortum Oyj 2009 33 2008 General Committees 1 
Fortum Oyj 2008 30 2008 General Committees 1 
Fortum Oyj 2008 33 2008 General Committees 1 
Metsä Board Oyj 2011 26 2010 General Committees 1 
Neste Oyj 2009 9 2008 General board of directors 1 
Neste Oyj 2009 39 2008 General Remuneration 1 
Neste Oyj 2008 9 2008 General board of directors 1 
Neste Oyj 2008 39 2008 General Remuneration 1 
Nokia Oyj 2017 24 2015 Genuine Remuneration 5 
Nokia Oyj 2016 24 2015 Genuine Remuneration 5 
Nokia Oyj 2015 39 2010 Genuine Remuneration 5 
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Nokia Oyj 2014 39 2010 Genuine Remuneration 5 
Nokia Oyj 2013 39 2010 Genuine Remuneration 5 
Nokia Oyj 2013 46 2010 Genuine Remuneration 5 
Nokia Oyj 2012 39 2010 Genuine Remuneration 5 
Nokia Oyj 2011 39 2010 Genuine Remuneration 5 
Nokia Oyj 2010 39 2010 Genuine Remuneration 5 
Telia Company 2012 Swedish  Swedish  Transitional board of directors 4 
Konecranes 2016 5 2015 Transitional board of directors 4 
Konecranes 2016 6 2015 Transitional board of directors 4 
Kone Oyj 2017 16 2015 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2017 17 2015 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2017 18a 2015 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2016 16 2015 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2016 17 2015 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2016 18a 2015 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2015 26 2010 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2015 29 2010 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2015 32 2010 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2014 26 2010 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2014 29 2010 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2014 32 2010 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2013 26 2010 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2013 29 2010 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2013 32 2010 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2012 26 2010 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2012 29 2010 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2012 32 2010 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2011 26 2010 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2011 29 2010 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2011 32 2010 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2010 26 2010 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2010 29 2010 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2010 32 2010 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2009 26 2008 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2009 29 2008 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2009 32 2008 Inline Committees 2 
Appendixes    60 
 
Kone Oyj 2008 26 2008 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2008 29 2008 Inline Committees 2 
Kone Oyj 2008 32 2008 Inline Committees 2 
Orion Oyj 2017 15 2015 Genuine Committees 5 
Orion Oyj 2009 22 2008 General Committees 1 
Orion Oyj 2008 22 2008 General Committees 1 
Orion Oyj 2010 22 2008 General Committees 1 
Orion Oyj 2016 15 2015 Genuine Committees 5 
Orion Oyj 2015 15 2015 Genuine Committees 5 
Orion Oyj 2014 22 2010 General Committees 1 
Orion Oyj 2013 22 2010 General Committees 1 
Orion Oyj 2012 22 2010 General Committees 1 
Orion Oyj 2011 22 2010 General Committees 1 
Outotec Oyj 2009 24 2008 General Committees 1 
Tieto Oyj 2017 5 2015 Genuine board of directors 5 
Tieto Oyj 2016 5 2015 Genuine board of directors 5 
Tieto Oyj 2015 5 2015 Genuine board of directors 5 
Outokumpu Oyj 2009 22 2008 General Committees 1 
Metso Oyj 2008 28 2008 General Committees 1 
Metso Oyj 2009 28 2008 General Committees 1 
Outokumpu Oyj 2008 22 2008 General Committees 1 
 
Appendixes    61 
 
7.6 Concertation of Ownership – top 5 shareholders, results by company 
Company 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
Amer Sports Oyj 17.93 18.01 18.01 19.07 20.65 21.21 19.09 17.29 15.29 28.47 
Cargotec Oyj 74.73 74.90 75.17 76.07 72.30 75.50 75.5 75.26 75.17 74.80 
Elisa Oyj 19.87 20.80 20.82 20.98 22.92 25.62 26.68 26.76 26.65 26.15 
Furtum Oyj 53.47 54.08 54.74 53.51 53.83 54.61 55.44 54.84 54.87 54.74 
Huhtamäki Oyj 21.45 20.19 19.48 22.58 24.52 27.38 25.40 26.62 29.40 28.83 
Kesko Oyj 33.24 32.61 31.99 31.53 31.16 31.04 28.68 28.51 30.49 30.31 
Kone Oyj  71.51 71.51 71.45 72.05 72.04 72.08 71.80 71.75 71.81 72.10 
Konecranes Oyj 19.10 17.80 18.30 18.30 21.70 22.90 24.20 22.10 15.30 13.70 
Metsä Board Oyj 78.00 79.47 78.87 79.59 79.53 78.78 78.76 77.74 77.26 77.32 
Metso Oyj 21.80 21.30 23.20 21.60 19.30 18.60 21.70 18.50 18.20 18.40 
Neste Oyj 54.40 54.45 55.92 54.58 55.56 56.09 57.94 56.88 55.99 56.62 
Nokia Oyj 3.27 3.26 4.45 5.26 5.76 5.79 4.57 3.49 2.070 1.56 
Nokia Renkaat Oyj 7.04 6.74 8.19 11.96 13.16 13.41 15.22 13.19 12.80 14.40 
Nordea Ab 32.80 32.20 31.60 33.00 32.40 44.00 44.30 49.30 49.00 41.10 
Orion Oyj 20.48 20.00 19.73 19.68 19.16 19.13 17.64 18.21 18.47 18.84 
Outokumpu Oyj 31.31 33.64 33.19 41.06 56.98 31.49 46.06 48.18 44.36 44.36 
Outotec Oyj 35.86 35.75 35.56 31.3 27.14 25.38 17.81 12.43 12.71 13.74 
Sampo Oyj  21.07 22.29 22.64 22.93 26.42 27.41 28.23 28.94 29.07 28.91 
Stora Enso Oyj 71.10 71.30 71.3 71.1 70.90 70.80 71.10 71.20 71.00 70.30 
Telia Company 45.70 47.10 45.00 52.70 54.90 57.80 59.3 N.A. N.A. 57.50 
Tieto Oyj 15.32 14.73 15.03 19.29 21.84 25.05 24.12 23.14 19.7 N.A. 
UPM Kymmene Oyj 4.33 4.91 5.21 7.81 7.69 7.29 11.19 9.11 7.86 7.77 
Valmet Oyj 20.71 20.91 19.3 20.94 19.4 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Wärtsilä 30.89 30.58 31.3 30.54 29.95 22.56 26.48 26.88 26.93 27.88 
YIT Oyj 22.34 20.6 24.74 28.1 25.94 29.20 29.19 25.27 26.49 25.00 
Average 33.11 33.17 33.41 34.62 35.41 35.96 36.68 35.03 34.39 36.21 
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7.7 Concertation of Ownership – top 10 shareholders, results by company 
Company 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
Amer Sports Oyj 26.71 24.93 24.72 27.62 28.99 30.1 27.13 23.78 21.07 33.9 
Cargotec Oyj 76.38 76.7 77.5 78.81 79.61 81.16 80.61 79.83 79.43 79 
Elisa Oyj 22.16 23.13 22.95 23.55 26.17 28.24 29.85 29.57 31.24 31.07 
Furtum Oyj 55.06 55.88 56.94 55.49 55.99 56.76 57.45 56.52 56.49 56.17 
Huhtamäki Oyj 25.98 25 23.64 26.46 28.52 31.64 31.51 32.83 36.07 35.42 
Kesko Oyj 39.22 38.26 37.37 36.52 35.82 36 35.37 34.45 34.77 34.71 
Kone Oyj  73.86 73.94 74 75.41 74.95 75.15 75.44 75.65 75.75 76.03 
Konecranes Oyj 23.3 20.7 22.5 22.4 26.4 27.7 30.1 27.3 21.3 17.8 
Metsä Board Oyj 79.3 81.04 80.59 81.64 81.85 81.04 80.72 79.04 78.21 78.49 
Metso Oyj 26.2 25 27.2 26.1 23.8 23.3 26.1 22.2 21 21.2 
Neste Oyj 56.1 56.39 57.99 56.79 58.06 58.39 59.69 59.13 58.43 59.44 
Nokia Oyj 4.89 4.51 5.71 6.77 7.21 7.4 5.61 4.53 2.86 2.16 
Nokia Renkaat Oyj 9.01 8.61 10.6 14.6 16.81 16.43 17.82 15.98 15.33 18 
Nordea Ab 40.9 37.8 37 39.1 38.5 50.6 51 55.5 55.1 47.1 
Orion Oyj 28.19 28.51 28.06 28.21 27.83 27.54 26.73 27.16 29.04 29.32 
Outokumpu Oyj 34.82 36.06 35.69 45.01 59.11 33.94 49.56 51.29 47.13 47.25 
Outotec Oyj 40.46 41.06 39.54 36.52 32.06 29.75 21.35 15.61 16.49 16.94 
Sampo Oyj  23.41 24.65 24.83 25.2 28.56 29.06 29.68 30.84 31.96 31.35 
Stora Enso Oyj 75 75.3 75.1 74.8 75.4 75.3 74.9 74.6 74.4 73.6 
Telia Company 51.2 52.4 49.1 57.7 61.7 62.1 64.3 N.A. N.A. 64.8 
Tieto Oyj 18.77 17.84 18.49 23.61 26.11 30.33 32 29.46 27.9 N.A. 
UPM Kymmene Oyj 6.65 7.91 8.54 10.85 10.67 10.42 14.29 11.73 10.11 10 
Valmet Oyj 24.54 25.61 23.47 25.43 23.92 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Wärtsilä 34.24 34.3 35.12 34.76 33.71 25.52 29.76 29.79 29.85 30.87 
YIT Oyj 31.5 27.63 33.35 34.35 32.5 35.86 36.68 33.08 34.1 31.18 
Average 37.11 36.93 37.2 38.71 39.77 40.16 41.15 39.12 38.61 40.25 
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7.8 Foreign Ownership, results by company 
Company 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
Amer Sports Oyj 48.38 49.91 51.18 46.22 43.9 42.4 48.7 51.3 52.6 45.2 
Cargotec Oyj 31.19 26.15 19.58 21.09 21.68 14.51 18.57 25.15 22.86 25.92 
Elisa Oyj 44.85 43.17 42.28 37.44 30.41 28.04 27.74 26.19 28.89 30.71 
Furtum Oyj 30.6 28.05 25.2 32.35 26.18 25.36 28.3 30.24 30.99 35.16 
Huhtamäki Oyj 48.64 48.12 50.04 43.21 39.59 33.55 25.78 24.98 28.7 23.84 
Kesko Oyj 31.29 31.97 27.35 27.27 28.74 18.35 19.89 25.9 20.47 19.95 
Kone Oyj  51.53 51.45 50.62 50.66 49.42 53.27 52.02 49.87 50.5 51.78 
Konecranes Oyj 59.86 53.98 49.51 47.95 45.42 38.58 31.86 49.25 55.55 63.2 
Metsä Board Oyj 19.55 14.76 19.76 14.71 11.59 10.63 9.75 14.22 N.A. N.A. 
Metso Oyj 54.7 57.2 51.6 49.6 49.3 48.4 48.8 53.9 53.6 55.6 
Neste Oyj 31.52 20.25 25 25.06 17.15 15.14 19.36 18.55 17.06 20.62 
Nokia Oyj 79 82.54 80.66 76.89 77.03 72.98 78.15 82.76 87.83 89.02 
Nokia Renkaat Oyj 74.5 76.9 72.5 60.9 64.3 61.1 60.2 62.4 62.2 59 
Nordea Ab Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  
Orion Oyj 38.85 43.46 40.52 40.03 33.76 33.13 31.45 26.4 23 24.53 
Outokumpu Oyj 38.19 39.63 29.59 30.28 41.65 43.21 17.21 19.86 27.96 33.84 
Outotec Oyj 42.38 39.82 27.01 29.19 36.35 46.33 56.36 59.79 57.96 61.9 
Sampo Oyj  62.4 60.95 60.69 59.84 56.79 54.65 52.4 48.47 48.98 49 
Stora Enso Oyj Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  
Telia Company Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  
Tieto Oyj 61.9 63.1 63.8 57.3 50.6 46.6 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
UPM Kymmene Oyj 70.5 68.8 67.5 62.4 60.5 56.3 51.8 56.2 59.3 65 
Valmet Oyj 50.11 49.43 51.31 54.71 47.8 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Wärtsilä 55.92 54.95 51.89 48.08 51.26 51.86 47.72 51.07 45.42 45.81 
YIT Oyj 15.99 29.51 26.29 29.31 33.79 34.82 32.22 37.93 38.69 36.52 
Average 47.36 47.00 44.72 42.93 41.69 39.49 37.91 40.72 42.77 44.03 
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7.9 Finnish Households Ownership, results by company 
Company 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
Amer Sports Oyj 13.02 12.71 11.74 12.37 11.7 11.8 12.1 12.4 12.4 13.2 
Cargotec Oyj 14.16 14.83 16.71 18.84 16.23 18.65 16.01 14.61 15.75 14.29 
Elisa Oyj 25.72 26.53 26.94 29.35 31.72 31.06 30.19 30.06 26.99 24.74 
Furtum Oyj 10.21 10.84 11.39 8.15 10.82 9.84 7.69 7.39 6.71 4.98 
Huhtamäki Oyj 15.22 14.97 15.32 16.74 17.54 18.35 21.01 21.87 18.96 19.42 
Kesko Oyj 25.7 25.14 26.19 26.99 24.63 30.39 28.83 27.96 29.38 29.36 
Kone Oyj  13.03 13.19 13.51 13.55 13.62 12.53 12.76 13.16 12.6 11.87 
Konecranes Oyj 11.12 13.74 14.3 14.78 14.65 15.73 17.69 13.25 13.22 10.9 
Metsä Board Oyj 18.1 17.83 16.88 17.46 18.65 19.83 21.62 24.93 N.A. N.A. 
Metso Oyj 11.8 12.3 14 14 15.7 14.7 12.9 12.5 14.2 12.8 
Neste Oyj 8.74 9.59 11.08 12.33 14.91 14.48 13.68 12.85 13.95 9.81 
Nokia Oyj 8.2 7.67 8.61 9.96 10.5 13.04 9.94 7.48 5.35 4.18 
Nokia Renkaat Oyj 10.6 10.4 11.5 16.4 10.6 11.8 11.9 12 12.5 12 
Nordea Ab Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  
Orion Oyj 39.57 39.42 41.16 42.62 46.09 47.79 49.54 51.8 52 48.25 
Outokumpu Oyj 19.74 17.67 26.79 18.25 22.14 14.41 18.38 15.68 13.57 9.58 
Outotec Oyj 14.2 25.64 21.13 19.04 16.19 10.74 11.3 13.75 16.62 9.48 
Sampo Oyj  11.1 10.87 10.63 10.77 10.76 11.13 11.56 12.51 11.59 11.6 
Stora Enso Oyj Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  
Telia Company Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  
Tieto Oyj 10.8 10.9 10.6 11.1 12.8 12 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
UPM Kymmene Oyj 15.1 15.3 15.8 17.2 18.7 19.9 19.9 18.4 17.5 14.9 
Valmet Oyj 13.56 13.46 14.45 14.01 15.71 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Wärtsilä 17.66 18.4 18.98 20.3 21.01 21.37 23.1 22.98 26.16 24.23 
YIT Oyj 30.6 27.49 29.47 30.66 24.59 20.81 22.05 19.9 19.59 19.32 
Average 16.27 16.77 17.60 17.95 18.15 18.11 18.61 18.27 17.84 16.05 
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7.10 Finnish Institutions Ownership, results by company 
Company 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
Amer Sports Oyj 38.6 37.38 37.08 41.41 44.4 45.8 39.2 36.3 35 41.6 
Cargotec Oyj 54.65 59.02 63.71 60.07 62.09 66.84 65.42 60.24 61.39 59.79 
Elisa Oyj 29.43 30.3 30.78 33.21 37.87 40.9 42.07 43.75 44.12 44.55 
Furtum Oyj 59.19 61.11 63.41 59.5 63 64.8 64.01 62.37 62.3 59.86 
Huhtamäki Oyj 36.14 36.91 34.64 40.05 42.87 48.1 53.21 53.15 52.34 56.74 
Kesko Oyj 43.01 42.89 46.46 45.74 46.63 51.26 51.28 46.14 50.15 50.69 
Kone Oyj  35.44 35.36 35.87 35.79 36.96 34.2 35.22 36.97 36.9 36.35 
Konecranes Oyj 29.02 32.28 36.19 37.27 39.93 45.69 50.45 37.5 31.23 25.9 
Metsä Board Oyj 62.35 67.41 63.36 67.83 69.76 69.54 68.63 60.85 N.A. N.A. 
Metso Oyj 33.5 30.5 34.4 36.4 35 36.9 38.3 33.6 32.2 31.6 
Neste Oyj 59.74 70.16 63.92 62.61 67.94 70.38 66.96 68.6 68.99 69.57 
Nokia Oyj 12.8 9.79 10.73 13.15 12.47 13.98 11.91 9.76 6.82 6.8 
Nokia Renkaat Oyj 14.9 12.7 16 22.7 25.1 27.1 27.9 25.6 25.3 29 
Nordea Ab Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  
Orion Oyj 21.58 17.12 18.32 17.35 20.15 19.08 19.01 21.8 25 27.22 
Outokumpu Oyj 42.07 42.7 43.62 51.47 36.21 42.38 64.41 64.46 58.47 56.58 
Outotec Oyj 43.42 34.54 51.86 51.77 47.46 42.93 32.34 26.46 25.42 28.62 
Sampo Oyj  26.5 28.18 28.68 29.39 32.45 34.22 36.04 39.02 39.43 39.4 
Stora Enso Oyj Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  
Telia Company Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  
Tieto Oyj 27.3 26 25.6 31.6 36.6 41.4 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
UPM Kymmene Oyj 14.4 15.9 16.7 20.4 20.8 23.8 28.3 25.4 23.2 20.1 
Valmet Oyj 36.33 37.11 34.24 31.28 36.49 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Wärtsilä 26.42 26.65 29.13 31.62 27.73 26.77 29.18 25.95 28.42 29.96 
YIT Oyj 53.41 43 44.24 40.03 41.62 44.37 45.73 42.17 41.72 44.16 
Average 36.37 36.23 37.68 39.12 40.16 42.40 43.48 41.00 39.39 39.92 
 
 
